Public Conceptions of Scientific Consensus

Slater, Matthew H.; Huxster, Joanna K.; Scholfield, Emily R.

doi:10.1007/s10670-022-00569-z

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 53 publications

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“…Let’s suppose it’s true. We have argued elsewhere (Slater et al forthcoming) that, despite some empirical evidence to the contrary, 3 the epistemic significance of a certain robust sort of consensus does not carry over straightforwardly to providing actionable advice about how to leverage consensus for more successful science communication. This is true for a variety of reasons, we think; but an especially salient one for our present purposes is that much of the lay public apparently lacks the background knowledge about science as a social enterprise required to appreciate the epistemic significance of scientific consensus.…”

Section: Trust Of Whom/what?mentioning

confidence: 96%

Trust of Science as a Public Collective Good

Slater¹,

Scholfield²

2022

Philos. sci.

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The COVID-19 pandemic and global climate change crisis remind us that widespread trust in the products of the scientific enterprise is vital to the health and safety of the global community. Insofar as appropriate responses to these (and other) crises require us to trust that enterprise, cultivating a healthier trust relationship between science and the public may be considered as a collective public good. While it might appear that scientists can contribute to this good by taking more initiative to communicate their work to public audiences, we raise a concern about unintended consequences of an individualistic approach to such communication.

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Section: Trust Of Whom/what?mentioning

confidence: 96%

Trust of Science as a Public Collective Good

Slater¹,

Scholfield²

2022

Philos. sci.

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Journalism and public trust in science

Schipani

2024

Synthese

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Journalists are often the adult public’s central source of scientific information, which means that their reporting shapes the relationship the public has with science. Yet philosophers of science largely ignore journalistic communication in their inquiries about trust in science. This paper aims to help fill this gap in research by comparing journalistic norm conflicts that arose when reporting on COVID-19 and tobacco, among other policy-relevant scientific topics. I argue that the public’s image of scientists– as depositories of indisputable, value-free facts, trustworthy only when in consensus– makes it particularly difficult for journalists to ethically communicate policy-relevant science rife with disagreement. In doing so, I show how journalists, like scientists, face the problem of inductive risk in such cases. To overcome this problem, I sketch a model of trust in science that is grounded in an alternative image of scientists– what I call the responsiveness model of trust in science. By highlighting the process of science over its product, the responsiveness model requires scientists to respond to empirical evidence and the public’s values to warrant the public’s trust. I then show why this model requires journalists to be the public’s watchdogs by verifying and communicating whether scientists are being properly responsive both epistemically and non-epistemically.

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Public Conceptions of Scientific Consensus

Cited by 2 publications

References 53 publications

Trust of Science as a Public Collective Good

Trust of Science as a Public Collective Good

Journalism and public trust in science

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