Psychology and International Relations Theory

Goldgeier, James; Tetlock, Philip E.

doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.67

Cited by 147 publications

(64 citation statements)

References 76 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…4 More generally, it is worth considering the possibility that a sense of injustice is an important part of the explanation for the contention in prospect theory that actors are likely to be more risk accepting in situations they understand as entailing the avoidance of loss. On prospect theory in international relations, see Levy (1997) and Goldgeier and Tetlock (2001).…”

Section: Taking the Justice Motive Seriouslymentioning

confidence: 99%

Cyber Futures and the Justice Motive: Avoiding Pyrrhic Victory

Raymond¹

2018

MCA

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Taking the Justice Motive Seriouslymentioning

confidence: 99%

Cyber Futures and the Justice Motive: Avoiding Pyrrhic Victory

Raymond¹

2018

MCA

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Jack Levy (1992) brought prospect theory into the picture somewhat later. Levy 2013, Goldgeiger and Tetlock 2001, and Stein 2017) discuss this first wave of work.…”

Section: Two Approaches To Behavioral Irmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research Bets and Behavioral IR

Powell¹

2017

Int Org

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Behavioral IR faces a fundamental challenge. The actors in most IR models and theories are not individuals-they are aggregates like states, ministries, interest groups, political parties, and rebel factions. There are two broad approaches to attempting to integrate behavioral research about individuals. The first, a quasi-behavioral approach, makes nonstandard assumptions about the preferences, beliefs, or decision-making processes of aggregate actors. The second tries to build theories in which the key actors are individuals. Pursuing the former means that the assumptions about actors will be only weakly linked to the empirical findings propelling behavioral research. The second approach faces formidable obstacles that international relations theory has confronted for a long time and for the most part has not overcome.Behavioral economics has been one of the most active and productive areas of research in economics in recent years. Given the close methodological parallels between economics and rational-choice approaches to international relations (IR) theory, it is natural to ask how and to what extent the insights, ideas, findings, and, more broadly, the approach of behavioral economics will affect IR theory. The essays in this special issue try to provide a "framework for integrating the new behavioral revolution into international relations." 1 The issue "aims to chart a strategy for incorporating the new behavioral revolution more fully into international relations." 2 I offer some conjectures about the likely impact of the behavioral revolution on the study of international relations and highlight some of the challenges a truly behavioral approach to international relations theory faces. The ultimate impact, of course, will not be known for some time and will depend on the "research bets" scholars make and which of them pay off. 3 Watching those research bets play out in the coming years will be very exciting.The compelling empirical evidence driving behavioral economics is that individuals deviate in systematic ways from the predictions of the standard model. However, the actors in most IR models are not individuals-they are aggregates like states, ministries, interest groups, political parties, rebel groups, etc. Incorporating the empirical findings in IR models thus poses a significant challenge.There are two broad approaches to dealing with the mismatch between behavioral findings about individuals and the fact that the actors in most IR models and theories are aggregate actors. One approach, which might be called quasi-behavioral, is to 1. Hafner-Burton et al. 2017, S4. 2. Ibid., S3. 3. See Lake and Powell 1999 for a discussion of research bets in international relations.

show abstract

“…Notes 1. For excellent reviews on the recent developments in diverse psychological approaches, see Goldgeier and Tetlock (2001), Levy (2003), McDermott (2004), and Stein (2002).…”

Section: Declaration Of Conflicting Interestsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Signaling and perception in international crises: Two approaches

Kurizaki

2016

Journal of Theoretical Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study contrasts the rationalist and psychologist approaches to information failure as the cause of crisis escalation and war. Building on the psychological insights on misperception, it presents a simple game-theoretic model of crisis bargaining, where signals are subject to perceptual errors and thereby multiple interpretations. The model allows us to analyze the interplay between the problem of misrepresentation in sending signals and the problem of misperception in forming beliefs. The analysis offers a rationalist logic of signaling and perception, which links Bayesian learning, incentive problems, misperception, and war. The analysis also shows that misperception generates more than pathologies in crises-misperception, under the right condition, makes signals fully informative, reduces the risk of war, and attenuates the adverse impact of incomplete information on the risk of crisis escalation and war.

show abstract

Psychology and International Relations Theory

Cited by 147 publications

References 76 publications

Cyber Futures and the Justice Motive: Avoiding Pyrrhic Victory

Cyber Futures and the Justice Motive: Avoiding Pyrrhic Victory

Research Bets and Behavioral IR

Signaling and perception in international crises: Two approaches

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About