Psychology and Indispensability

Daly, Chris

doi:10.5840/monist201396426

Cited by 9 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…People possess vast amounts of folk-psychological knowledge that has accrued through years of social interaction and cultural exposure to folk-psychological narratives (Hutto, 2012;Heider, 1958;Malle, 2006). Several scholars of philosophy of mind and cognitive science, who are in substantial disagreement over what folkpsychological constructs, such as intentional states, really are and how they can be scientifically explained (e.g., Churchland, 1981;Fodor, 1975;Dennett, 1989;Stich, 1983;Searle, 2008), have drawn attention to the remarkable precision with which people are able predict and explain behavior based on folk psychology (Daly, 2013). For example, Pylyshyn, who called folk psychology "undoubtedly the most successful predictive scheme available for human behavior"⁴ (Pylyshyn, 1980), illustrated this point using the following example: ⁴Similar remarks have been made by other philosophers of mind.…”

Section: How It Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Robots as Intentional Agents

Thellman

2021

Linköping Studies in Arts and Sciences

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Linköping Studies in Arts and Sciences ⋅ No. 811 At the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Linköping University, research and doctoral studies are carried out within broad problem areas. Research is organized in interdisciplinary research environments and doctoral studies mainly in graduate schools. Jointly, they publish the series Linköping Studies in Arts and Sciences. This thesis comes from the Division for Human-Centered Systems at the Department of Computer and Information Science. Edition 1:1

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Section: How It Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Robots as Intentional Agents

Thellman

2021

Linköping Studies in Arts and Sciences

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“…To my mind, the most important aspect of eliminativism lies not in its dubious futuristic predictions/postulates but in its negative ontological claim that beliefs do not exist (this ontological aspect of eliminativism is treated as central by e.g. Daly 2013). In this way, the eliminativist claim is the most straightforward and radical form of denying the reality of beliefs.…”

Section: Eliminative Materialismmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Think about the Debate over the Reality of Beliefs

Posłajko

2021

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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The aim of this paper is to propose a new conceptualization of the distinction between realism and anti-realism about beliefs that is based on the division between natural and non-natural properties, as defined by Lewis. It will be argued that although the traditional form of anti-realism about beliefs, namely eliminative materialism, has failed (as it led to unacceptable consequences), there is a possibility to reformulate the division in question. The background assumption of the proposal is the framework of deflationism about truth and existence: it will be assumed that beliefs can be said to exist and their attributions can said to be true. The aim is to show that even when we buy into such assumptions we can meaningfully distinguish between the realist and anti-realist approach to belief. According to the proposal, the paradigmatic anti-realist view on beliefs should be seen as a conjunction of three claims: that belief attributions do not track objective similarities, that beliefs are not causally active, and that there is no viable way of naturalizing content. It will be shown that seeing the debate in the proposed way has important advantages as it allows the issue of belief realism to be made non-trivial and tractable, and it introduces theoretical unity into contemporary metaphysics of beliefs.

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“…For the purposes of the present paper, the defining feature of eliminative materialism is taken to be the negative ontological thesis that there are no beliefs (this definition is adopted for example, by Daly 2013). The eliminative materialist is to be defined as a theorist who endorses the claim that will be subsequently referred to as the eliminativist thesis that Bthere are no beliefs^, regardless of the way this thesis is justified.…”

Section: What Is Eliminative Materialism?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Eliminativism: the Problem of Representation and Carnapian Metametaphysics

Posłajko

2018

Acta Anal

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The aim of this paper is to propose a new reading of eliminative materialism concerning propositional attitudes, along the lines of broadly understood Carnapian metametaphysics. According to the proposed reading, eliminativism should be seen as a normative metalinguistic claim that we should dispose of terms like Bbeliefs^and associated linguistic rules. It will be argued that such reading allows a significant philosophical problem which besets eliminativism to be solved: the problem of representation. The general idea of the problem of representation, which is taken to be one of the aspects of the celebrated Bcognitive suicide^issue, is that an eliminativist has a problem with maintaining that her position represents reality. It will be argued that on the Carnapian reading an eliminativist might put forward a negative ontological claim without the need to invoke any representationalistic notions.

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Psychology and Indispensability

Cited by 9 publications

References 8 publications

Social Robots as Intentional Agents

Social Robots as Intentional Agents

How to Think about the Debate over the Reality of Beliefs

Eliminativism: the Problem of Representation and Carnapian Metametaphysics

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