Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931)

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“…Moreover, considering Husserl as a pratyekabuddha seemed to me to explain why so many of his students and followers failed to "get it" with respect to actually attaining the phenomenological attitude and transpersonal comprehension. This failure is at the very core of Husserl's disappointment with his protégé, Martin Heidegger, who ran off to teach university philosophy before becoming a mature contemplative (see Husserl, 1997). Others of Husserl's students (e.g., Eugene Fink, Gerhard Funke, Ludwig Landgrebe) did hang around experience to occur.…”

Psicologia eidética e teoria do conhecimento nas Investigações lógicas de Husserl

“…According to Husserl (1927Husserl ( /19971925/1962, from Descartes up to the end of the 19 th century, there are two principles that remain presupposed by the vast majority of philosophers: (i) the conception of the theory of knowledge must be founded on a science of subjectivity. That is, anyone who wants to understand what knowledge is and how it is produced must focus on the cognitive operations of the mind, or, more particularly, of human understanding.…”

“…His latter solution was to separate the phenomenology into two parts: a phenomenological psychology, which should be considered a form of descriptive and a priori psychology (or eidetic psychology) and a pure phenomenology (or transcendental phenomenology) (Kockelmans, 1994). From 1917onward, Husserl (1917/19871997) would argue that there is a parallelism between these two disciplines, so that the results of one may be transposed, with some adjustments, to the other. This is the reason why Husserl continued perceiving the phenomenology from Logical Investigations as a form of psychology, although eidetic (1925/1962).…”

How to return to subjectivity: Natorp, Husserl, and Lacan on the limits of reflection

“…This does not mean however that something is "wrong" with psychology, nor with the other sciences that operate within this attitude, as long as we understand its scientific activity and its accomplishments as, indeed, always starting from and situated in this attitude. On the contrary, Husserl recognizes in this "uncritical presupposition" one of the pillars that carries the success of those sciences (Husserl, 1925(Husserl, /1997). Husserl's point is simply that, when aspiring to understand the "general thesis" itselfthe experiential fact of there-being-a-world-for-us-psychology does not have anything to tell us, nor does any other science that studies objects in this given world.…”

“…To schematize the foregoing argument: if it is (a) the task of transcendental phenomenology to understand the thesis of the naturalistic attitude-this is its explanandum-and if (b) the sciences always already operate from the presupposition and pre-givenness of this explanandum, then it follows that (c) phenomenology should avoid any reference to those sciences because otherwise (d) elements from the explanandum would reappear in the phenomenological elucidation of the explanans. According to Husserl, this would amount to what he calls "the transcendental circle, which consists in presupposing something as beyond question when in fact it is encompassed by the all-inclusiveness of that very question (Husserl, 1925(Husserl, /1997.…”