Pskov Under the LDPR: Elections and Dysfunctional Federalism in One Region

Slider, Darrell

doi:10.1080/09668139998705

Cited by 12 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…Since Tumanov was defeated by the young member of the State Duma LDPR faction, Evgenii Mikhailov (backed by the nationalist party leader Vladimir Zhirinovskii) (Vagin, 1997), this election can be considered as a tactical victory for the mayor. However, Mikhailov tried to centralize control over all economic and political resources in the region (Alexseev and Vagin, 1999;Slider, 1999) and announced a plan for the redistribution of urban revenues to the rural districts. This threatened city autonomy and fueled the conflict between city and region.…”

Section: Cities Vs Regions: Toward An Empirical Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although some scholars focused primarily on the contest of 'governors vs mayors' (Slider, 2000), the core of these controversies certainly extends beyond those personalities. Regional-local conflicts reflect fundamental center-periphery cleavages: the split between big cities as centers of modernization and the rest of the regional areas, which (with several exceptions) fall into the category of periphery or semiperiphery.…”

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confidence: 99%

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In search of local autonomy: the politics of big cities in Russia's transition

Gel'man

2003

Int J Urban Regional Res

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Despite a series of local government reforms in the 1990s, Russia's localities still lack serious autonomy. Only big cities maintain hopes for the emergence of local autonomy and local democracy. City politics has produced multiple conflicts between regional and local authorities; however, regional-local relations merely reflect fundamental center-periphery controversies on a smaller territorial scale. While big cities and their metropolitan areas serve as centers of political, economic and social modernization, other regional areas are lost in the peripheries. During Russia's transition period, some large cities acquired more political and economic autonomy from regions than others did. This article concentrates on the crucial role of (1) political opportunities inherited from the late-Soviet period; and (2) strategic choices of political actors in the post-Soviet period. The constellation of initial conditions and outcomes of political conflicts have contributed greatly to the diversity of city politics and urban autonomy in Russia's cities. Finally, the article considers the possible impact of local autonomy in Russia's cities on national social, economic and political developments. Copyright Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003.

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Section: Cities Vs Regions: Toward An Empirical Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

In search of local autonomy: the politics of big cities in Russia's transition

Gel'man

2003

Int J Urban Regional Res

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“…The Pskov region, on the other hand, established a reputation for its Sovietstyle economic management, analysed by e.g. Slider (1999), and for its proximity to the national border with the Baltics, described by Alexeev-Vagin (1999).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Tale of Two City-States; Novgorod and Pskov in the 1990s

Solanko

Tekoniemi

2000

SSRN Journal

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This paper examines two regions of the Russian Federation, Novgorod and Pskov, to compare how differences in economic policy affect economic development. Despite common histories, geography and natural resources, Novgorod committed early on to policies that would attract foreign investments in production. Pskov, on the other hand, withdrew into protectionist policies until it was clear that efforts to increase domestic and foreign investment levels were needed. Using available statistics, we consider the reasoning that led these regions down such distinctly different economic policy paths and consequences of these choices.

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“…5 5 Slider (1999) provides an overview of vodka politics in Pskov oblast'. The motives behind economic policy in Pskov were laid out in many interviews with Evgenii Mikhailov, the governor from 1997 to 2004; see, e.g., Pskovskaya Pravda , February 28, 1997.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Consequences of Collective Action: An Incomplete‐Contracts Approach

Gehlbach

2006

American J Political Sci

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Public policy may be determined as much by what cannot be agreed to by politicians and organized interests as by what can. Focusing on the inability of organized groups to credibly promise that their members will fully report revenues to tax authorities, I develop an incomplete-contracts lobbying model that shows that the provision of collective goods may be influenced by the anticipated tax compliance of economic sectors as well as by the organization of interests. Data from a survey of firms in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are broadly supportive of the theory: the ability of firms to hide revenues from tax authorities rivals conventional collective-action variables in explaining variation in collective-goods provision, but only in that part of the postcommunist world where differences in revenue hiding across sectors are especially large.

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Pskov Under the LDPR: Elections and Dysfunctional Federalism in One Region

Cited by 12 publications

References 2 publications

In search of local autonomy: the politics of big cities in Russia's transition

In search of local autonomy: the politics of big cities in Russia's transition

A Tale of Two City-States; Novgorod and Pskov in the 1990s

The Consequences of Collective Action: An Incomplete‐Contracts Approach

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