PS-TRUST: Provably secure solution for truthful double spectrum auctions

Chen, Zhili; Huang, Liusheng; Li, Lü; Yang, Wei; Miao, Haibo; Tian, Miaomiao; Wang, Fei

doi:10.1109/infocom.2014.6848057

Cited by 37 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 21 publications

(31 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Thus, this assumption is not always true. In other related works [6], [14], [34], the authors adopted the similar system architecture. They mainly focused on protecting bid privacy, but did not consider bidders' coverage/interference area privacy.…”

Section: B Dynamic Spectrum Auctionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A General Privacy-Preserving Auction Mechanism for Secondary Spectrum Markets

Huang

Gui

et al. 2016

IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Auctions are among the best-known market-based tools to solve the problem of dynamic spectrum redistribution. In recent years, a good number of strategy-proof auction mechanisms have been proposed to improve spectrum utilization and to prevent market manipulation. However, the issue of privacy preservation in spectrum auctions remains open. On the one hand, truthful bidding reveals bidders' private valuations of the spectrum. On the other hand, coverage/interference areas of the bidders may be revealed to determine conflicts. In this paper, we present PISA, which is a PrIvacy preserving and Strategy-proof Auction mechanism for spectrum allocation. PISA provides protection for both bid privacy and coverage/interference area privacy leveraging a privacy-preserving integer comparison protocol, which is well applicable in other contexts. We not only theoretically prove the privacy-preserving properties of PISA, but also extensively evaluate its performance. Evaluation results show that PISA achieves good spectrum allocation efficiency with light computation and communication overheads.Index Terms-Mechanism design, privacy preservation, radio spectrum management.

show abstract

Section: B Dynamic Spectrum Auctionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A General Privacy-Preserving Auction Mechanism for Secondary Spectrum Markets

Huang

Gui

et al. 2016

IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In previous work, introduced a trust‐worthy party into the auction and then proposed secure McAfee‐based double auctions such that no party in the auction has the knowledge to obtain any sensitive information. The major difference between these two schemes is that employs the mechanisms of order preserving encryption and oblivious transfer while utilizes the Paillier cryptosystem. In , the authors masked the bidding prices with a vector of ciphertexts and ensured that the auctioneer can find the maximum value, randomize the bids, and charge the bidders securely based on homomorphic encryption.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In , the authors masked the bidding prices with a vector of ciphertexts and ensured that the auctioneer can find the maximum value, randomize the bids, and charge the bidders securely based on homomorphic encryption. However, , , and have drawbacks. In the auctioneer can know the bids of all buyer groups and their ranking order in the auctions.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Secure multi-unit sealed first-price auction mechanisms

Larson

et al. 2016

Security Comm. Networks

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Due to the popularity of auction mechanisms in real‐world applications and the increasing awareness of securing private information, auctions are in dire need of bid‐privacy protection. In this paper, we design three secure, multi‐unit, sealed‐bid, first‐price auction schemes. The first is a secure auction using homomorphic encryption and is denoted by SAHE; the second is a secure action using masking values and is denoted by SAMV; and the third has an improved masked noise algorithm, denoted by ISAMV. In the first, SAHE, the auction is processed on encrypted bids by a server, and the final output is only known by the auctioneer. Neither the auctioneer nor the server can obtain the full information of the bidders. The second and third auctions, SAMV and ISAMV, decrease computational complexity. Instead of homomorphic encryption, they use random noise to mask the bid values. By using a masking method, the server only knows the noise, and the auctioneer only knows the auction results; neither will see the private information of the bidders. All three schemes enable the auctioneer to verify that the winners have paid the correct amounts. A thorough theoretical analysis is performed to evaluate the security properties, computational complexity, and communication complexity of the auctions. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

show abstract

“…Moreover, the current research works and literatures have studied revenue maximization auction [5], truthfulness guaranty auction [6][7][8], flexible auction [9], and so on. Spectrum auction has been widely discussed in literature [10,11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stackelberg game-based precoding and power allocation for spectrum auction in fractional frequency reuse cognitive cellular systems

Zhao

Nie

Chen

2016

J Wireless Com Network

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Spectrum auction has been considered as a promising approach to effectively reallocate spectrum resources in the secondary spectrum market. In our previous work, spectrum auction in a fractional frequency reuse (FFR) cognitive cellular system was studied. However, the bidding and valuation model of secondary users (SUs) are not close to practical applications as they introduced a random value of a fixed scope. In this paper, through an optimal interference price announced by the primary user (PU), a joint precoding and power allocation algorithm via Stackelberg game (OIPPS) is proposed to improve the spectrum auction problem subject to the interference constraint of PU, the transmission power constraint of SUs, and the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) constraint of each SU in the FFR cognitive cellular system. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the proposed OIPPS algorithm in terms of the convergence of precoding and power allocation vectors and the maximized sum utility of SUs while taking full consideration of the PU's revenue. Besides, a comparison between the bidding improved spectrum auction scheme and a traditional method is proposed to show the effectiveness of our proposed algorithm.

show abstract

PS-TRUST: Provably secure solution for truthful double spectrum auctions

Cited by 37 publications

References 21 publications

A General Privacy-Preserving Auction Mechanism for Secondary Spectrum Markets

A General Privacy-Preserving Auction Mechanism for Secondary Spectrum Markets

Secure multi-unit sealed first-price auction mechanisms

Stackelberg game-based precoding and power allocation for spectrum auction in fractional frequency reuse cognitive cellular systems

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About