Proving Reliability of Anonymous Information in VANETs

Kounga, Gina; Walter, Thomas; Lachmund, Sven

doi:10.1109/tvt.2008.2010325

Cited by 51 publications

(65 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…A recent approach is to use signature-based technique (e.g. [16,7]) to achieve anonymous authentication. All these schemes are suitable for authorization.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Improvements on an authentication scheme for vehicular sensor networks

Liu

Yuen

et al. 2014

Expert Systems with Applications

110

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In a recent paper, Shim (2012) presented a very interesting authentication scheme for vehicular sensor networks. Shim claimed that the scheme is secure against the highest adopted level of attack, namely the chosen-message attack (CID-CMA). Nevertheless, we find that the proof in Shim's paper does not actually prove that the scheme is secure in this level. Instead, it can only ensure that the scheme is secure in a strictly weaker level of attack, the adaptive chosen-identity and no-message attack (CID-NMA). In this paper, first we show that there exist some security risks in vehicular networks if a scheme, which is only secure against CID-NMA but not CID-CMA, is deployed. Hence, having the proof that the scheme is only CID-NMA is insufficient for the aforementioned application. That is, Shim did not prove that the proposed scheme can resist these kinds of attack. Here, we use a different approach to prove the scheme for security against CID-CMA. We note that this proof is essential to ensure that the scheme can indeed be used for the aforementioned scenario. In addition, we also show that the batch verification of the scheme, proposed in the same paper, may have non-negligible error. Two invalid signatures may give a positive result. We further improve the batch verification part so that the error rate can be reduced to negligible level. AbstractIn a recent paper, Shim [21] presented a very interesting authentication scheme for vehicular sensor networks. Shim claimed that the scheme is secure against the highest adopted level of attack, namely the chosen-message attack (CID-CMA). Nevertheless, we find that the proof in Shim's paper does not actually prove that the scheme is secure in this level. Instead, it can only ensure that the scheme is secure in a strictly weaker level of attack, the adaptive chosenidentity and no-message attack (CID-NMA). In this paper, first we show that there exist some security risks in vehicular networks if a scheme, which is only secure against CID-NMA but not CID-CMA, is deployed. Hence, having the proof that the scheme is only CID-NMA is insufficient for the aforementioned application. That is, Shim did not prove that the proposed scheme can resist these kinds of attack. Here, we use a different approach to prove the scheme for security against CID-CMA. We note that this proof is essential to ensure that the scheme can indeed be used for the aforementioned scenario. In addition, we also show that the batch verification of the scheme, proposed in the same paper, may have non-negligible error. Two invalid signatures may give a positive result. We further improve the batch verification part so that the error rate can be reduced to negligible level.

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“…A recent approach is to use signature-based technique (e.g. [16,7]) to achieve anonymous authentication. All these schemes are suitable for authorization.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Improvements on an authentication scheme for vehicular sensor networks

Liu

Yuen

et al. 2014

Expert Systems with Applications

110

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“…Furthermore, the system should not only provide safety message traceability to prevent inside attacks, but also have reasonable overheads for the revealing the identity of a message sender. Chen et al (2011);Daza et al (2009);Kounga et al (2009);Wu et al (2010): A message is viewed as trustworthy only after it has been endorsed by at least n vehicles, where n is a threshold. The threshold mechanism is a priori countermeasure that improves the confidence of other vehicles in a message.…”

Section: Efficient Anonymous Authentication Of Safety Messagesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Most recently, Kounga et al Kounga et al (2009) proposed a solution that permits vehicles to verify the reliability of information received from anonymous origins. In this solution, each vehicle can generate the public/private key pairs by itself.…”

Section: Basic Schemementioning

confidence: 99%

“…security and privacy preservation for mobile vehicles Calandriello et al (2007); Chen et al (2011); Daza et al (2009);Hubaux et al (2004); Kamat et al (2006); Kounga et al (2009) ;Li et al (2008); Lin et al (2007;2008a;b); ; Mak et al (2005); Plöβl & Federrath (2008); Raya & Hubaux (2005;2007); 2010a;b); Wasef et al (2010); Wang et al (2008); Wu et al (2010); Xu et al (2007); Xi et al (2007;2008) ;Xiong et al (2010a;b); Zhang et al (2008a;b). Obviously, any malicious behaviors of user, such as injecting beacons with false information, modifying and replaying the previously disseminated messages, could be fatal to the other users.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Anonymous Authentication Protocols for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks: An Overview

Xiong¹,

Guan²,

Hu³

et al. 2012

Applied Cryptography and Network Security

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“…In case of an integrity problem, a warning message is broadcast throughout the whole area in the range and a revocation step is requested from the CAbased on the evidence collected. It is notable that the vehicles' keys are stored in the On-Board Unit(OBU) of the vehicle using tamper-proof hardware technology.As in [8][9][10], thistamper-proof hardware, which is also called trusted component, has protected storage for secrets and can performcryptographic operations.…”

Section: Generating Certificates On the Flymentioning

confidence: 99%