Proving Idealism Dharmakīrti

Abstract

The existence of the external world is a major contested issue among Buddhist and Brahmanical thinkers in the logico-epistemological period of Classical Indian philosophy (c.5th–12th century ce). Buddhist philosophers aligned with the idealist Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda tradition refuted external objects with different methods and arguments. Two philosophers who contributed significantly to the discussion are Vasubandhu (probably between 350 and 420 ce) and Dharmakīrti (between mid-6th and mid-7th century ce), who was one of the two main figures in the logico-epistemological or pramāṇa school. Vasubandhu’s refutation of external objects in his Viṃśikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ has been interpreted as an argument from ignorance that external objects do not exist because there is no evidence for their existence. Dharmakīrti’s main arguments against external objects from Pramāṇavārttika and Pramāṇaviniścaya are different. Investigating them in light of his elimination of arguments from ignorance from his own and original logical theory offers new possibilities for appreciating his stance on idealism.

Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu on the principle of sufficient reason

“…Vasubandhu uses this same strategy to reject the ultimate reality of unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) dharmas, each of which he understands to be a mere negation (pratiśedhamātra) or non-existence (abhūta) (AKBh ad 2.55d). See Kellner (2017) for an analysis of this line of reasoning in AKBh 9 as an argument from ignorance, where she argues that this same strategy is operative in Vasubandhu's case for idealism in the Viṃśikā. Siderits (2021) has argued, lines of reasoning of this sort might more charitably be characterized as "arguments from lightness," insofar as they are driven by an implicit commitment to a principle of parsimony.…”

Taking non‐conceptualism back to Dharmakīrti

“…52 52 Though, this line of argument is sound only on Dharmakīrti's external realist theory of perception. If Dharmakīrti qua Yogācāra idealist drops sensory contact with an external object as a necessary causal condition of perception, then prior memory‐states or memory traces are free to generate what appear to be sense perceptions of external objects – see Kellner (2017b, p. 315). …”

“…In the last analysis, however, Dharmakīrti rejects this presumption and claims that conscious mental states are only ever non‐conceptually acquainted with themselves. What's more, this reflexive perceptual acquaintance is ultimately non‐representational, insofar as awareness intrinsically lacks a representational structure ( ākāra ) involving an intentional object to be apprehended ( grāhya ) and a vehicle that carries out that apprehension ( grāhaka ) (Kellner, 2017a, 2017b). The appearance of any dualistic representational structure – even in the putatively non‐conceptual perception of objects – is a fundamentally cognitive illusion that happens to be as experientially stubborn as illusions born of sensory defects (Eltschinger, 2005, pp.…”

“…We will raise the issue of perceptual resemblance again in Section 4. See alsoKellner (2017aKellner ( , 2017b for further discussion of Dharmakīrti's conditional support for (and ultimate rejection of) the view that perception represents objects in virtue of resembling them.…”

“…2 2 It is important to qualify that Dharmakīrti does not ultimately accept the existence of mind‐independent entities as being fundamentally real, which problematizes the notion that perception represents external objects (see Kellner, 2017a, 2017b). That said, he does provisionally accept realism about an extra‐mental world when elaborating an epistemology of ordinary perceptual experience.…”