Provable analysis and improvement of smart card–based anonymous authentication protocols

Abstract

Summary Nowadays, authentication protocols are essential for secure communications specially for roaming networks, distributed computer networks, and remote wireless communication. The numerous users in these networks rise vulnerabilities. Thus, privacy‐preserving methods have to be run to provide more reliable services and sustain privacy. Anonymous authentication is a method to remotely authenticate users with no revelation about their identity. In this paper, we analyze 2 smart card–based protocols that the user's identity is anonymous. However, we represent that they are vulnerable to privileged insider attack. It means that the servers can compromise the users' identity for breaking their privacy. Also, we highlight that the Wen et al protocol has flaws in both stolen smart card and stolen server attacks and the Odelu et al protocol is traceable. Then, we propose 2 modified anonymous authentication protocols. Finally, we analyze our improved protocols with both heuristic and formal methods.

Zero‐knowledge‐based distributed auditing protocol

“…The adversary is assumed as a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary who can present on public channels and eavesdrop (the eceive query) to learn a bit of knowledge about under‐auditing data. Additionally, it is able to send orrupt and eveal queries to the random oracle 25 …”

“…Additionally, it is able to send orrupt and eveal queries to the random oracle. 25 Regarding the mentioned abilities of  and based on the proposed ZK-based DAP goals,  tries to learn a bit of knowledge about the under-auditing data (or break data confidentiality) so that ADV Confidentiality  > 𝜀.…”