Prototypical Argumentative Patterns in a Legal Context: The Role of Pragmatic Argumentation in the Justification of Judicial Decisions

Feteris, Eveline T.

doi:10.1007/s10503-015-9376-0

Cited by 17 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 13 publications

(7 reference statements)

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“…2 Nevertheless, the question posited 1 Works analyzing judicial argumentation are almost uncountable, and some of them are particularly profound and well argued. One of the reasons for the present work is that even one of the finest analyses (Feteris 2016) seems to underestimate, in general, the role played by moral -at least: not consequentialist-arguments.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 77%

Empathy, Not Truth: Can a Dialectical and Skeptical Argumentation Enhance Both Democracy and Human Rights Courts?

Puppo¹

2018

CRHF

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Who is the best moral reasoner, the judge or the legislator? The aim of this paper is to refine this question, by distinguishing between different metaethical assumptions. If the meta-ethical assumptions of arguers are incompatible or if their institutional goal is to establish some truth, there is no way of entering into a constructive argumentative activity. My claim is that only when arguers renounce any epistemic temptation and feel empathy with respect to others’ arguments, caninstitutions improve the quality of their judicial and democratic arguments, and therefore gain authority.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 77%

Empathy, Not Truth: Can a Dialectical and Skeptical Argumentation Enhance Both Democracy and Human Rights Courts?

Puppo¹

2018

CRHF

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“…They are not special problems connected to only legal defeasibility. 30 On this scheme, see Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992), Feteris (2002Feteris ( , 2016. On the different meanings of 'absurdity' in law, see Dougherty (1994).…”

Section: The Many Faces Of Legal Defeasibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For a detailed analysis seeFeteris (2016),Gales and Solan (2020).7 The case was firstly reported byPufendorf (1688), Book V, Ch. 12, §8.…”

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confidence: 90%

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Defeasibility, Law, and Argumentation: A Critical View from an Interpretative Standpoint

Poggi

2020

Argumentation

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The phenomenon of defeasibility has long been a central theme in legal literature. This essay aims to shed new light on that phenomenon by clarifying some fundamental conceptual issues. First, the most widespread definition of legal defeasibility is examined and criticized. The essay shows that such a definition is poorly constructed, inaccurate and generates many problems. Indeed, the definition hides the close relationship between legal defeasibility and legal interpretation. Second, this essay argues that no new definition is needed. I will show that from an interpretative standpoint, there is nothing special about legal defeasibility. Contrary to what some authors maintain, no unique or privileged source of legal defeasibility exists, nor are there privileged arguments to justify it. Specifically, legal defeasibility refers to interpretative outcomes deriving from interpretative arguments that, on the one hand, are very different from one another, and, on the other, are often employed to justify different interpretative outcomes. In the legal field, the problems related to defeasibility have little in common with the problems that this label covers in other areas—such as logic or epistemology—and they are nothing but the well-known problems related to legal interpretation. In conclusion, this paper argues that as far as legal argumentation is concerned, the notion of legal defeasibility lacks explanatory power, and it should be abandoned.

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“…Pragma-dialecticians have qualitatively investigated the prototypical argument pattern containing pragmatic argumentation in the legislative (Andone 2016;Van Eemeren and Garssen 2014;Garssen 2016), legal (Feteris 2016), medical and scientific (Wagemans 2016) domains.…”

Section: Design Theoretical Requirements: Argument Patternsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Discovering Argumentative Patterns in Energy Polylogues: A Macroscope for Argument Mining

Musi

Aakhus

2018

Argumentation

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A macroscope is proposed and tested here for the discovery of the unique argumentative footprint that characterizes how a collective (e.g., group, online community) manages differences and pursues disagreement through argument in a polylogue. The macroscope addresses broader analytic problems posed by various conceptualizations of large-scale argument, such as fields, spheres, communities, and institutions. The design incorporates a two-tier methodology for detecting argument patterns of the arguments performed in arguing by an interactive collective that produces views, or topographies, of the ways that issues are generated in the making and defending of standpoints. The design premises for the macroscope build on insights about argument patterns from pragma-dialectical theory by incorporating research and theory on disagreement management and the Argumentum Model of Topics. The design reconceptualizes prototypical and stereotypical argument patterns for characterizing large-scale argumentation. A prototype of the macroscope is tested on data drawn from six threads about oil-drilling and fracking from the subreddit Changemyview. The implementation suggests the efficacy of the macroscope's design and potential for identifying what communities make controversial and how the disagreement space in a polylogue is managed through stereotypical argument patterns in terms of claims/premises, inferential relations, and presentational devices.

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Prototypical Argumentative Patterns in a Legal Context: The Role of Pragmatic Argumentation in the Justification of Judicial Decisions

Cited by 17 publications

References 13 publications

Empathy, Not Truth: Can a Dialectical and Skeptical Argumentation Enhance Both Democracy and Human Rights Courts?

Empathy, Not Truth: Can a Dialectical and Skeptical Argumentation Enhance Both Democracy and Human Rights Courts?

Defeasibility, Law, and Argumentation: A Critical View from an Interpretative Standpoint

Discovering Argumentative Patterns in Energy Polylogues: A Macroscope for Argument Mining

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