2013
DOI: 10.1017/cbo9781139380867
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Protest, Reform and Repression in Khrushchev's Soviet Union

Abstract: Protest, Reform and Repression in Khrushchev's Soviet Union explores the nature of political protest in the USSR during the decade following the death of Stalin. Using sources drawn from the archives of the Soviet Procurator's office, the Communist Party, the Komsomol and elsewhere, Hornsby examines the emergence of underground groups, mass riots and public attacks on authority as well as the ways in which the Soviet regime under Khrushchev viewed and responded to these challenges, including deeper KGB penetra… Show more

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Cited by 44 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…The challenges included the 1956 Budapest uprising, popular protests demanding better conditions at home, and the domestic dissident movements. Such challenges were met not only with brute force, but were also dealt with through preventative/prophylactic methods (profilaktika), punitive psychiatry, targeted repressions against particular dissidents, and greater penetration of the KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti-Committee for State Security, USSR's main security agency) into the society (see Hornsby 2010). If Stalin's Great Purge was truly terrifying due to its totalizing and annihilating nature visà-vis the society where no one could be safe, Khrushchev's repressions in a milieu of limited liberalization were much less terrorizing and, from the standpoint of those who grew up during that period, perhaps even desirable.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The challenges included the 1956 Budapest uprising, popular protests demanding better conditions at home, and the domestic dissident movements. Such challenges were met not only with brute force, but were also dealt with through preventative/prophylactic methods (profilaktika), punitive psychiatry, targeted repressions against particular dissidents, and greater penetration of the KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti-Committee for State Security, USSR's main security agency) into the society (see Hornsby 2010). If Stalin's Great Purge was truly terrifying due to its totalizing and annihilating nature visà-vis the society where no one could be safe, Khrushchev's repressions in a milieu of limited liberalization were much less terrorizing and, from the standpoint of those who grew up during that period, perhaps even desirable.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Outhwaite () reiterates points made by Burawoy () on the importance of moving beyond an elite agency approach where working classes are merely “demobilized” (Eyal, Szelényi, & Townsley, ), to do better justice to the reality of antagonistic class relations after communism. In the historical context, sociology has recently also painted a more nuanced picture of the contested nature of the inner life of industrial socialism and its workers as more than the passive victims of state power (Hornsby, ; Kenney, ; Pittaway, ).…”
Section: The Scholarly Heritage Of Class‐studies—communism As a Labormentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Nor was the Khrushchevian approach consistently liberal; the early 1960s witnessed a crackdown. 33 While these studies of gulag release and regime engagement with dissent draw in part on memoirs and interviews, their main sources are archival, and it is not accidental that these subjects were not tackled in the era prior to archival access. To begin, it may have been necessary to have archive-based studies of the gulag itself before scholars would be ready to tackle its undoing.…”
Section: Reflections and Extensions: Related Recent And Current Studiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“… Gorlizki, "Theft under Stalin,[32][33], based on documents reprinted in Istoriia Stalinskogo gulaga 1: sec. 7.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%