Protection or expropriation: Politically connected independent directors in China

Wang, Lihong

doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2015.02.015

Cited by 156 publications

(158 citation statements)

References 37 publications

(93 reference statements)

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“…Furthermore, firms with political connections are more tax aggressive [34]. Wang (2015) empirically tests politically-connected independent directors' roles in China's listed companies and finds that, for both private and state-owned companies, the existence of this kind of independent director can lead to more related-party transactions [20].…”

Section: The Roles Of Political Connectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The first channel refers to the decision-making logic where the politically-connected board chairmen behave similarly to government officials [18] and push listed companies to invest more in ECER to achieve the government's goal. The second channel suggests that since political connection can bring resources to listed companies [19,20], companies may invest more in ECER in return. Due to the existence of these two channels, we can argue that listed companies with politically-connected board chairmen will invest more in ECERI.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, we open the black box of China's manufacturing enterprises' green governance by analyzing the relationship between board chairmen's political connection and the amount of ECERI and the channels through which political connection can impact ECERI. Second, extant empirical findings about whether political connection can benefit listed companies are mixed [20,21]. This is because scholars try to explain the roles of political connection from different perspectives.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Does a Board Chairman’s Political Connection Affect Green Investment?—From a Sustainable Perspective

et al. 2018

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Using a sample consisting of China's listed manufacturing companies which issue A-shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges from 2008-2014, this study empirically tests the relationship between board chairman's political connections and the amount of energy conservation and emission reduction investment. The results show that the existence of politically-connected board chairmen positively affects green investment. In addition, marketization degrees negatively moderate the relationship between political connection and green investment, which supports an institutional logic perspective. The amount of redundant resources also has the same moderating effect, which is consistent with the resource exchange perspective.

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Section: The Roles Of Political Connectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Does a Board Chairman’s Political Connection Affect Green Investment?—From a Sustainable Perspective

et al. 2018

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“…Thus, central SOEs usually carry less political burdens in contracts with local SOEs (Cheung et al, 2010;Wu et al, 2012 andWang, 2015). Moreover, the incentive for using SOEs to implement political agendas is weaker for the central government than for local governments because there is no interjurisdictional competition in governments, and competition for promotion among central bureaucrats is absent.…”

Section: Central and Local Government-controlled Soesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To overcome this institutional disadvantage, non-SOEs cultivate close relationships with the government by acquiring political connections (Fan et al, 2008;Xu et al, 2013;Lin et al, 2015;Wang, 2015). Non-SOEs in China are often denied access to external financial markets, which deters them from carrying out value-creating projects.…”

Section: Access To External Financing Marketsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How do political connections cause SOEs and non‐SOEs to make different M&A decisions/performance? Evidence from China

Liu

Luo

Tian

2017

Accounting & Finance

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This study examines the impact that political connections have on Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) performance and the decisions of Chinese listed firms. We find that political connections destroy (create) value in SOEs (non-SOEs). Our findings show that connected SOEs are more likely to acquire local targets, especially when the local unemployment rate is high and when the firms are controlled by the local government, and they are less likely to conduct vertical mergers. M&A decisions of connected non-SOEs are less influenced by the government; instead, political connections in non-SOEs help bidders to integrate vertically and obtain external financing support.

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Turnover of local government core officials, political connections and the investment and financing of private‐sector enterprises

Nahm

Song

2020

Int. J Fin Econ

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In this study, we examined the power operation and policymaking mechanisms of local governments in China and analysed the sources of risk in macroeconomic policies. Based on the reality of local governance in China, this article defines political uncertainty as normal or abnormal changes in the Standing Members of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Provincial-level Committee. We analysed the impact of turnovers of these local core officials upon the investment and financing of local private-sector enterprises. We found that when changes in provincial inner core officials happened normally, the long-term impact on the investment and financing of local private-sector enterprises was not so obvious. However, when senior officials were investigated for corruption, the investment and financing of enterprises dropped significantly. For enterprises with personal political capital only, the impact of local core official turnover upon firm financing was even more pronounced. For private-sector enterprises with partial state ownership, however, this negative impact was significantly weakened in the long term.

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Protection or expropriation: Politically connected independent directors in China

Cited by 156 publications

References 37 publications

Does a Board Chairman’s Political Connection Affect Green Investment?—From a Sustainable Perspective

Does a Board Chairman’s Political Connection Affect Green Investment?—From a Sustainable Perspective

How do political connections cause SOEs and non‐SOEs to make different M&A decisions/performance? Evidence from China

Turnover of local government core officials, political connections and the investment and financing of private‐sector enterprises

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