2005
DOI: 10.1504/ijem.2005.008739
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Protection from extreme events: using a socio-technological approach to evaluate policy options

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Cited by 6 publications
(2 citation statements)
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References 12 publications
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“…Buldyrev et al (2010) note that power and communications networks are simultaneously interdependent, as power networks rely on communications networks for coordination while the communications networks depend on electricity for their basic functioning. Understanding the impact of this simultaneous interdependency is a critical issue for infrastructure research; there is much to learn about the depth of the systems' interdependencies, and how failures in one system may propagate across other systems (Gao et al 2012, Little 2005.…”
Section: Critical Infrastructurementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Buldyrev et al (2010) note that power and communications networks are simultaneously interdependent, as power networks rely on communications networks for coordination while the communications networks depend on electricity for their basic functioning. Understanding the impact of this simultaneous interdependency is a critical issue for infrastructure research; there is much to learn about the depth of the systems' interdependencies, and how failures in one system may propagate across other systems (Gao et al 2012, Little 2005.…”
Section: Critical Infrastructurementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The next step then, is to determine an appropriate threshold or cut-off point, such that a decision above the threshold would produce acceptable results within the limits or risk tolerance and one below it would not. Because no indicator is perfect, any "evacuate/don't evacuate" decision will result in some decisions to evacuate deemed correct when they are not (false positives) and some decisions not to evacuate deemed correct when they are not (false negatives) [18]. For example, on November 17, 2003, the Deep-Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis (DART) System in the Pacific Ocean detected a small tsunami generated by an earthquake near Adak, Alaska, but based on an assessment of data provided by DART buoys; no warning was issued for this event, which saved Hawaii an estimated $68 million.…”
Section: Figure 3 Components Of An End-to-end Tsunami Warning and MImentioning
confidence: 99%