“Protection for Sale” in a Developing Country: Democracy vs. Dictatorship

Mitra, Devashish; Thomakos, Dimitrios D.; Ulubaşoğlu, Mehmet

doi:10.1142/9789814569156_0009

Cited by 31 publications

(46 citation statements)

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“…Subsequent work has extended this framework in some directions. Mitra et al (2002) use information drawn from Turkey and include a democracy vs. dictatorship element. Mobarak and Purbasari (2006) studied firm-level import licenses and connections to Suharto in Indonesia.…”

Section: The Political Economy Of Trade Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

Trade and the New Silk Road: opportunities, challenges, and solutions

Yuan

Schmerer

2017

Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies

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More than 2000 years ago, the ancient Silk Road was a major trade link between the East and West. However, technological change and dramatic declines in transportation costs have since made it obsolete as container shipping and the advent of cargo flights have shifted trade from the surface to the sea or air. Nevertheless, China recently announced a new initiative that aims at establishing new connections between Europe and Asia, which are bypassing more modern transport routes in favor of railway connections. This special issue is dedicated to research related to this new initiative. ARTICLE HISTORY

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Section: The Political Economy Of Trade Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

Trade and the New Silk Road: opportunities, challenges, and solutions

Yuan

Schmerer

2017

Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies

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“…Therefore, throughout this section, as well as in Section 4, we maintain that countries share the same political bias parameter: i = for all i. 22 …”

Section: Equilibrium Analysis Under Symmetrymentioning

confidence: 99%

Preferential versus multilateral trade liberalization and the role of political economy

Stoyanov

Yildiz

2015

European Economic Review

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In this paper we analyze the e¤ect of the freedom to pursue preferential trade liberalization, permitted by Article XXIV of the GATT, on country's incentives to participate in multilateral negotiations and on the feasibility of the global free trade. We present a model in which countries choose whether to participate in preferential or multilateral trade agreements under political pressures from domestic special interest groups. We show that heterogeneity in political preferences across countries plays an important role for the relative merits of preferential and multilateral approaches to trade liberalization. On one hand, the opportunity to liberalize preferentially may be necessary to induce countries with strong political motivations to participate in multilateral free trade negotiations. On the other hand, when countries share similar political preferences, multilateral free trade that would have been politically supported otherwise becomes unattainable if countries can pursue preferential liberalization.JEL codes: F12, F13, C72.

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“…Much attention has also been devoted to the role of lobby groups (e.g. Grossman and Helpman 1994;Helpman 1995, Goldberg andMaggi 1999;Mitra 1999;Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000;Mitra, Thomakos, and Ulubaşoǧlu 2002). Other studies have focused on different political factors, such as governments' inability to commit to policy choices (Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 1998) or ratification rules (Conconi, Facchini, and Zanardi 2012).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Policymakers' horizon and trade reforms: The protectionist effect of elections

Conconi

Facchini

Zanardi

2014

Journal of International Economics

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This paper shows that electoral incentives deter politicians from supporting trade liberalization. We focus on all major trade liberalization bills introduced since the early 1970s in the U.S. Congress, in which House and Senate members serve respectively two-and six-year terms and one third of senators face elections every two years. We show that senators are more likely to support trade liberalization than House representatives. However, this result does not hold for the last generation of senators, who face elections at the same time as House members, suggesting that inter-cameral differences are driven by term length. Considering senators alone, we find that the last generation is less likely to support trade liberalization than the previous two. This result is pervasive and holds both when comparing the behavior of different senators voting on the same bill and that of individual senators voting on different bills. The protectionist effect of election proximity disappears for senators who are retiring or hold safe seats.JEL classifications: D72, F10.

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“Protection for Sale” in a Developing Country: Democracy vs. Dictatorship

Cited by 31 publications

References 0 publications

Trade and the New Silk Road: opportunities, challenges, and solutions

Trade and the New Silk Road: opportunities, challenges, and solutions

Preferential versus multilateral trade liberalization and the role of political economy

Policymakers' horizon and trade reforms: The protectionist effect of elections

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