Protecting Triple-DES Against DPA

Low-Cost First-Order Secure Boolean Masking in Glitchy Hardware

“…From the area results, we can see that our design is more compact than the DOM-dep version in [4] but slightly larger than the DOM-indep version. Our design uses 30 secAND2 gates per DES S-Box, compared to 22 DOM-indep gates in [4]. While secAND2 gates are by design smaller than the DOMindep gates, the additional modules in our implementation (e.g.…”

“…The performance results are summarized in Table I. We also provide the numbers from the work in [4], reporting a 3DES implementation protected with DOM, in the table. Note that the number of cycles reported in [4] is scaled down to compare with our DES implementation.…”

“…We also provide the numbers from the work in [4], reporting a 3DES implementation protected with DOM, in the table. Note that the number of cycles reported in [4] is scaled down to compare with our DES implementation. From the area results, we can see that our design is more compact than the DOM-dep version in [4] but slightly larger than the DOM-indep version.…”

“…Note that the number of cycles reported in [4] is scaled down to compare with our DES implementation. From the area results, we can see that our design is more compact than the DOM-dep version in [4] but slightly larger than the DOM-indep version. Our design uses 30 secAND2 gates per DES S-Box, compared to 22 DOM-indep gates in [4].…”

“…compensate the gain to some extent. An important remark here is that our GE results include a masked key schedule whereas the results in [4] include the cost of an unmasked key schedule. The overhead caused by this module further explains the difference between both designs.…”