Protecting the smart grid: A risk based approach

A Criticality-based Approach for the Analysis of Smart Grids

“…One key aspect of realization of Smart Grids is risk. There is a growing support suggesting the need to address 'risk' related to Smart Grids [11,15,32,33,40,54,57,62,72,75,90,91]. The following section provides an initial exploration into the concept of risk for Smart Grids as well as its quantification.…”

“…Availability of threat agents [F2] Availability of threat agents -agents including "company employees, terrorists, espionage agents, extortionists, hackers, cyber-criminals, customers, and outsourced maintenance staff" that are willing to realize a threat" [11,62] Availability of attack routes [F3] Presence of routes/paths that can be used to exploit a system a Smart Grid and involves such mediums as wireless access points, intranet, mobile devices (e.g., USB devices) and Smart Meters [15,32,62,72] Ineffective protection measures [F4] Exploitability of a system which relates to how easy a Smart Grid can be attacked because of lack of security measure or having ineffective security measures such that "probability of [an] interception [of a threat] and the probability of neutralizing a given threat" ( [32], p. 4) is low [62] Exposure [F5] Entails a "condition of being unprotected from a severe condition" ( [47], p. 15) and involves being 'exposed to' threats [33] Reliability [F6] The probability that a system will perform its intended mission(s) when called upon to do so [47]. In a Smart Grid, reliability is related to being available "in the widespread presence of PHEVs [plug-in-hybrid-electric vehicles]" ( [33], p. 263) [72] Tolerance of stakeholders [F7] The willingness to allow existence of some risks and/or behavior that one does not necessarily agree with [75] Total number of lines [F8] The number of lines (e.g., power lines, communication nodes, etc.)…”

“…The domain of critical infrastructures revolves around chemicals, commercial facilities, communications, critical manufacturing, dams, defense industrial bases, emergency services, energy, financial, services, food and agriculture, government facilities, healthcare and public health, information technology, nuclear reactors, materials, and waste water systems [67]. Lately, there is increasing interest in the energy sector with respect to the critical importance of Smart Grids as a critical infrastructure [11,15,54,57,72,75]. Arguably, Smart Grids, similar to all critical infrastructures, operate under conditions of uncertainty with respect to natural events such as earthquakes and hurricanes as well as man-made events such as acts of sabotage and cyber-threats [42,80,86,92].…”

“…Against this backdrop, current research tends to focus on the potential benefits of Smart Grids [23] as well as issues and risks in implementation such as new cyber-threats and vulnerabilities [7,13,14,36,37]. Moreover, and perhaps due to the nascent nature of this topic, researchers are still debating the definitions of Smart Grids [21,40,70,78] as well as focusing on particular aspects and parts/elements of Smart Grids, including design for next-generation control centers [91], optimizing distributed power systems [75] effects of plug-in-hybrid-electric vehicles [33], security issues [4,6,8,62,64], Smart Meters [90], standards and best practices [32,87], and classification of threats [4,15,54] among others. However, there is still a scarcity of literature discussing quantitative methods that could be used in support of risk quantification for Smart Grids.…”

Delay makes a difference: Smart grid resilience under remote meter disconnect attack

“…The authors of [15] simulate malicious load shedding and reapplication (without delay countermeasures) in the Western Electricity Coordinating Council region and find that-while the system remains stable-reliability criteria can be violated. Implementing randomized time delay countermeasures for smart meter RCD can enhance the power system's resilience to these attacks in two important ways.…”