2011
DOI: 10.1109/tsg.2011.2159999
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Protecting Smart Grid Automation Systems Against Cyberattacks

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Cited by 142 publications
(70 citation statements)
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References 18 publications
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“…A smart meter also assists in remote billing and instant load feedback to the utility for load forecasting. As it is owned by the utility, the smart meter comes with inherent drawbacks related to data confidentiality and privacy [16][17][18]. On the contrary, an e-monitor is owned by the consumer and works independently alongside existing energy meters, without any direct effect on the billing.…”
Section: Basic Energy Monitoringmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A smart meter also assists in remote billing and instant load feedback to the utility for load forecasting. As it is owned by the utility, the smart meter comes with inherent drawbacks related to data confidentiality and privacy [16][17][18]. On the contrary, an e-monitor is owned by the consumer and works independently alongside existing energy meters, without any direct effect on the billing.…”
Section: Basic Energy Monitoringmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They also discuss security solutions to address these unique challenges. [21] proposes a layered security framework for protecting power grid automation systems against cyber attacks. The security framework satisfies the desired performance in terms of modularity, scalability, extendibility, and manageability and protects the smart grid against attacks from either Internet or internal network via integrating security agents, security switches and security managements.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Communication with such legacy devices should be secured by installing a modern security device, also known as bump-in-the-wire (BITW) device, adjacent to them [21]. The BITW device is issued a digital certificate from the CA on behalf of the legacy device.…”
Section: Securing Legacy Devicesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Those attackers can cause a wide variety of attacks, classified into three main categories [5], [6]: Component-wise, protocol-wise, and topology-wise. Component-wise attacks target the field components that include Remote Terminal Unit (RTU).…”
Section: Attackers and Types Of Attacksmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The development of these security solutions is faced with many challenges [5], [6] including: 1) some components use propriety OS to control functionality rather than security, 2) automation system network was designed without regard to security, 3) security should be integrated with existing systems without downgrading the performance, 4) remote access to grid devices should be monitored and controlled, and 5) the new protocols should have the capability of incorporating future security solution.…”
Section: Challenges For New Security Solutionsmentioning
confidence: 99%