Protecting Privacy and Controlling Bureaucracies: Constraints of British Constitutional Principles

Abstract

In the early 1960s, Western democracies began to confront the policy implications of a similar phenomenon: the computerization of personal information by large bureaucratic organizations. By 1978, the United States, Canada, and the major Western European countries had all adopted legislation to regulate the personal information practices of bureaucracies and to protect the privacy of individuals.' Britain, however, did not adopt legislation until 1984. As the oldest modern democracy, and one that has traditionally valued individual privacy, this appears puzzling. Why was Britain comparatively late in protecting a cherished value threatened by technological change?The answer is not that British policymakers ignored the issue. Indeed, policy discussions occurred for over twenty years. Nor was it that policymakers decided that existing protections were adequate. On the contrary, the need for new protections was widely recognized. Starting in 1961, a series of "right of privacy" and "data surveillance" bills were introduced and briefly discussed in Parliament. By 1970, increasing legislative support for policy action convinced the Labour government to establish both a Committee on Privacy to investigate privacy invasions in the private sector, and an interdepartmental committee to review computerized information systems in government departments. These investigations led to publication of a committee report in 1972 and a White Paper in 1975, and the establishment of the Committee on Data Protection in 1976. This committee's recommendations were reported in 1978. Four years later, the Conservative government responded with a White Paper, and in 1984 legislation was passed.Why, then, did the British government, regardless of the party in power and despite numerous proposals, founder in adopting policy? The argument made here is that the two proposed policy approaches conflicted with constitutional principles. The civil liberties approachwhich gives individuals positive rights with respect to personal information and places the courts in the role of resolving disputes between individuals and organizationsconflicted with the British tradition of protecting individual rights and the restrained role of the British courts. The i n~o r~u~i o n

Persuasive Technology and computational manipulation: hypernudging out of mental self-determination

“…Regarding the origin of the right to privacy, see Glancy (1979). On the right to privacy, see Prosser (1960), Thomson (1975), Regan (1990), Schwartz (1999), Mills (2008, Bennett (2010), Boehm (2011), andBennett (2018). As discussed in the following Section 7, the use of AI for manipulation Please, refer to Section for references and citations.…”

“…Regarding the origin of the right to privacy, see Glancy ( 1979 ). On the right to privacy, see Prosser ( 1960 ), Thomson ( 1975 ), Regan ( 1990 ), Schwartz ( 1999 ), Mills ( 2008 ), Bennett ( 2010 ), Boehm ( 2011 ), and Bennett ( 2018 ). As discussed in the following Section 7, the use of AI for manipulation suggests today the need to identify a new fundamental right to mental self-determination tailored to account for the ability of AI to affect and undermine the decision-making processes of individuals.…”