Propositions First: Biting Geach's Bullet

Abstract

To be a proposition is to possess propositional properties and to stand in inferential relations. This is the organic intuition, [OI], concerning propositional recognition. [OI] is not a circular characterization as long as those properties and relations that signal the presence of propositions are independently identified. My take on propositions does not depart from the standard approach widely accepted among philosophers of language. Propositions are truth-bearers, the arguments of truth-functions (‘not’, ‘or’, ‘and’, ‘if’), the arguments of propositional-attitude verbs (‘know’, ‘believe’, ‘doubt’, ‘assume’, ‘reject’) and the kind of entity capable of standing in inferential relations (which are basically implication and incompatibility). The aim of this paper is to argue for [OI]. In doing so, I will show that even what is probably the most repeated argument against non-descriptivism, the so-called Frege-Geach Argument (FGA), presupposes something like [OI], a presupposition that Geach shares with his critics. Despite the huge success of FGA, a thorough analysis of the actual scope of this argument has yet to be given. I will provide such an analysis in section 3 below. In this paper, I argue that [OI] is a meta-theoretical principle which is neutral with respect to specific metaphysical debates about the nature of propositions, as well as specific proposals about the semantics of declarative sentences.

Expressivism, Inferentialism and the Simulation Game

“…First, a number of philosophers have declared themselves to be ‘moral inferentialists’ and claimed that this solves the Frege‐Geach problem. (Examples are Chrisman 2015, Warren 2015, 2018, Woods 2017, Frapolli 2019.) This moral ‘inferentialism’ is supposed to contrast both with realism and expressivism.…”

“…First, a number of philosophers have declared themselves to be 'moral inferentialists' and claimed that this solves the Frege-Geach problem. (Examples are Chrisman 2015, Warren 2015, 2018, Woods 2017, Frapolli 2019 This moral 'inferentialism' is supposed to contrast both with realism and expressivism. These philosophers often have a general sympathy to general inferentialist accounts of meaning, which typically claim that possessing some concept just is being bound by rules that that define it.…”

“…11 By way of contrast, I comment on three recent authors. First, Maria Frapolli has a sustained discussion of moral propositions (Frapolli 2019). She emphasizes the inferential role of moral propositions, which is a good thing.…”