Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account

Chalmers, David J.

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00788.x

Cited by 80 publications

(88 citation statements)

References 23 publications

(26 reference statements)

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“…Second, Chalmers maintains that the truth of belief reports like 'Bert and his doctor both believe that arthritis is a disease' and presumably also agreement reports like 'Bert and his doctor agree that arthritis is a disease' does not require that Bert and his doctor believe that arthritis is a disease under a common primary intension. Instead, Chalmers claims that the truth of such reports requires only that Bert and his doctor have a belief with the same secondary intension (i.e., the secondary intension of 'arthritis is a disease' as used in the report), and that the primary intensions of their beliefs bear a certain 'coordination relation' to the primary intension of 'arthritis is a disease' as used in the report (Chalmers, 2011a). This framework is difficult to evaluate without a detailed account of the coordination relation, but at least it has the structure necessary to accommodate the data that drive the Burge arguments while also maintaining a sense in which content does not depend on the social environment.…”

Section: Chalmers Describes For Generating Primary Intensions -And Inmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two-Dimensionalism and the Social Character of Meaning

Ball

2013

Erkenn

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Section: Chalmers Describes For Generating Primary Intensions -And Inmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two-Dimensionalism and the Social Character of Meaning

Ball

2013

Erkenn

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“…Several authors have suggested links that may be judged to be apt for this task. For instance, some authors have considered a link between beliefs in terms of representation of the same Russellian or purely referential propositions (e.g., Heck 1995) or in terms of similarity of Fregean thoughts (e.g., Forbes 1987) or by means of a notion of coordination (e.g., Fine 2007, Chalmers 2011. In this paper, I would like to consider Chalmers's (2011) coordination-account.…”

Section: Rationality Out Disagreement Outmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pierre’s rational and public beliefs

Verdejo

2012

Principia

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Abstract. Paradigmatic cases of disagreement seem not to be compatible with a widespread kind of solution to Kripke's celebrated Pierre puzzle. As a result, the classical puzzle about rational belief is shown to be also a puzzle about public disagreement/agreement phenomena. In this paper, I defend that the new public version of the puzzle is substantial and challenging and conclude that a full solution to Kripke's considerations must offer a satisfactory account of both the rational and public character of belief attributions. I then argue that a notion of non-belief-individuating understanding is plausibly the key notion that would allow us to arrest both versions of the Pierre puzzle.

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“…This project is relevant to the assessment of recent work in the neoFregean literature. For example, Chalmers (2011) proposes a Fregean semantics for attitude ascriptions but does not show how to generalize it to de re readings compositionally. 3 An important test of any attitude semantics, however, is given by the question how well it handles cases of quantifying in.…”

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confidence: 96%

Quantifying in from a Fregean Perspective

Yalcin

2015

The Philosophical Review

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As Quine (1956) observed, the following sentence has a reading which, if true, would be of special interest to the authorities:(1) Ralph believes that someone is a spy.This is the reading where the quantifier is naturally understood as taking wide scope relative to the attitude verb and as binding a variable within the scope of the attitude verb. This essay is interested in addressing the question what the semantic analysis of this kind of reading should look like from a Fregean perspective—a perspective according to which attitude states are generally relations to structured Fregean thoughts composed of senses. The Fregean view faces a challenge of compositionality here. This essay describes the challenge and offers a response on the Fregean's behalf.

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Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account

Cited by 80 publications

References 23 publications

Two-Dimensionalism and the Social Character of Meaning

Two-Dimensionalism and the Social Character of Meaning

Pierre’s rational and public beliefs

Quantifying in from a Fregean Perspective

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