Propositionalism without Propositions, Objectualism without Objects

Abstract

Propositionalism is the view that all intentional states are propositional states, which are states with a propositional content, while objectualism is the view that at least some intentional states are objectual states, which are states with objectual contents, such as objects, properties, and kinds. This chapter argues that there is a distinction between the deep nature of intentional states and contents, which is what they really are, metaphysically speaking, and their superficial characters, which are the superficial features that characterize them as the intentional states or contents that they are. This chapter argues that there are two corresponding ways of understanding the debate between propositionalism and objectualism:(1) as a debate over whether there are intentional states with objectual deep natures, and (2) as a debate over whether there are intentional states with objectual superficial characters. I argue that we should understand the debate in the second way. I also argue that the propositionalism debate is fairly independent from debates over the deep nature of intentionality, and that this has implications for arguments for propositionalism and objectualism from claims about the nature of intentional content. I close with a brief discussion of how related points apply to the debate over singular content.

Propositional Attitudes as Self-Ascriptions

“…This is a contentious claim, which I have argued for elsewhere(Mendelovici 2018a). Note that this claim is compatible with the claim that we are introspectively acquainted with contents with a singular form(Mendelovici 2018b). …”

Reply to Philip Woodward’s review of The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality

“…But this worry presupposes that objectual contents are objects and propositional contents are propositions, an assumption that the aspect view can and should reject (see Mendelovici 2018b). Just as the aspect view needn't say that the content <red> involves the actual property of redness, it needn't say that objectual contents belong to the ontological category object.…”