Propositionalism about intention: shifting the burden of proof

Abstract

A widespread view in the philosophy of mind and action holds that intentions are propositional attitudes. Call this view ‘Propositionalism about Intention’. The key alternative holds that intentions have acts, or do-ables, as their contents. Propositionalism is typically accepted by default, rather than argued for in any detail. By appealing to a key metaphysical constraint on any account of intention, I argue that on the contrary, it is the Do-ables View which deserves the status of the default position, and Propositionalism which bears the burden of proof. I go on to show that this burden has not been met in the literature.

The Effects of Agility Ladders on Performance: A Systematic Review

“…The burden of proof should, nevertheless, be placed on the asserting party [14][15][16]. Consequently, it is important to evaluate whether the claims in the literature are substantiated by well-designed research.…”

Strong cognitivist weaknesses

“…36 Think, e.g., of "I'll plan to steal some pears if you do, too." 37 See again, e.g., Campbell (2019). Thanks to Lucy Campbell for discussion of the point at issue.…”

“…For philosophical emphasis of the place of non-propositional intention, seeBaier (1970);Thompson (2008), 120-22;Hornsby (2013);Campbell (2019).29 Marušić & Schwenkler (2018), 332. This is true even by the lights of ordinary language philosophy: "Ordinary language is not the last word: in principle it can everywhere be supplemented and improved upon and superseded.…”

“…Austin (1957).30 SeeMarušić & Schwenkler (2018), 324, 326-7, for the association of incompleteness of intention with its partiality and conditionality.31 SeeMarušić & Schwenkler (2018), 331-3. 32 See, e.g.,Campbell (2019), whose central argument against propositionalism hinges on this distinction.…”