Proposing a delay in payment contract for coordinating a two-echelon periodic review supply chain with stochastic promotional effort dependent demand

Ebrahimi, Samira; Hosseini‐Motlagh, Seyyed‐Mahdi; Nematollahi, Mohammadreza

doi:10.1007/s13042-017-0781-6

Cited by 45 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…There are a number of contracts to coordinate various decisions in SCs. Revenue sharing, delay in payments, collaborative models, cost‐sharing, two‐part tariff, compensation‐based wholesale price, and buy‐back are some examples of coordination contracts (Partha Sarathi et al., ; Bai et al., ; Ebrahimi et al., ; Nematollahi et al., , ; Johari et al., ; Johari and Hosseini‐Motlagh, ; Lambertini, ; Nouri et al., ; Raj et al., ). Although coordination models have been extensively applied in forward SCs, the coordination in the reverse flow of the chain has not yet been widely applied (Hu et al., ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Proposing channel coordination and horizontal cooperation in two competitive three‐echelon reverse supply chains

Rahmani

Haeri

Hosseini‐Motlagh

2019

Int Trans Operational Res

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Considering and analyzing various kinds of cooperation among supply chain members is an option for better managing each channel. It is noteworthy that in many real‐world cases, each of vertical and horizontal cooperation has an important role in the success of supply chains. Nevertheless, only vertical cooperation in most previous research is considered. This paper addresses both vertical and horizontal cooperation in two competitive reverse supply chains, each of which includes one collector, one remanufacturer, and one retailer. Our primary concern is to analyze quality improvement competition between the remanufacturers. Moreover, retail price competition between the retailers and the quality competition are simultaneously considered in the extended model. In this research, the investigated system has been analyzed under different structures including decentralized, centralized, horizontal cooperation, and coordinated decision‐making models. The results show that when the remanufacturers cooperate horizontally, the profit of each collector and that of the retailer will decrease compared with those in the decentralized structure. To overcome this problem, a new coordination contract named multiple‐link two‐part tariff is proposed to simultaneously coordinate the members of each chain. The proposed contract effectively convinces the remanufacturers to participate in the coordination model instead of the horizontal cooperation. Moreover, it provides a win–win–win condition for all chain members and improves the quality level of the remanufactured products. The results indicate the proper performance of the proposed contract in improving the benefits of the competing chains, especially when there exists no intense competition between the remanufacturers (i.e., when the market sensitivity to the quality of the remanufactured products is low and consequently less effort is needed to increase the quality of the remanufactured products). Moreover, the proposed contract not only is able to simultaneously increase both remanufactured products demand and of end‐of‐life products supply but also involves both economic and environmental benefits.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Proposing channel coordination and horizontal cooperation in two competitive three‐echelon reverse supply chains

Rahmani

Haeri

Hosseini‐Motlagh

2019

Int Trans Operational Res

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“…Ebrahimi et al investigated the coordination of promotional effort and replenishment decisions in a two-echelon supply chain including single supplier and single retailer. A coordination model based on delay in payment contract was proposed to motivate the retailer to participate in the joint decision-making model [10]. Hosseini-Motlagh et al analysed and compared the performances of the entire supply chain consisting of a monopolistic manufacturer and two competing retailers under three game structures.…”

Section: Supply Chain Coordination Under Information Asymmetrymentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination of elderly healthcare service supply chain with information asymmetry: Designs of option contracts under different demand distribution statuses

Zhao

2020

RAIRO-Oper. Res.

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This paper studies the issue of demand information asymmetry in an elderly healthcare service (EHS) system represented by a two-echelon elderly healthcare service supply chain (EHSSC) comprising an elderly service integrator (ESI) and a service provider (ESP). The goal of the ESI is to decide on how much service capacity is required for placing orders to the ESP, who directly serves the customers. Considering discrete and continuous demand distribution statuses, a centralised model with symmetric demand information and decentralised models with asymmetric demand information are developed to analyse the optimal ordering decisions and discuss the influence of information asymmetry. Furthermore, option contracts are applied to help coordinate the supply chain under asymmetric demand information based on different demand distribution statuses. Optimal option contract menus are designed for the ESP to promote the information sharing. Results show that the option contract can coordinate the EHSSC with asymmetric demand information under both discrete and continuous demand distribution statuses. The exercise price will be higher under lower demand information than that under higher demand information and the transfer payment will be less under lower demand information than that under higher demand information. Moreover, although the ESI has demand information superiority and can make use of opportunistic behaviour to maximise its own profit, the ESP as the leader can design the option contract to incentive the ESI to achieve true information sharing, and even obtain nearly all of the channel profit.

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“…e green quality and warranty period of products are two major factors which affect consumers' purchasing behavior. Ebrahimi [9] analyzed a supply chain with a monopolistic manufacturer aiming to release a new substitutable green product in addition to the conventional nongreen product and determine the green quality level of the new product. Hosseini-Motlagh [30] studied a competitive closed-loop supply chain and proposed a new function for supply of used products based on the service competition between the dealers.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since different supply chain contracts may result in different supply chain performances, proper choosing of supply chain contracts is important to the contract designers [6][7][8][9]. In this paper, we build a two echelon supply chain in which a manufacturer produces limit quality products and sells them to a retailer.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game Theoretic Analysis of After-Sales Service in Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Warranty Sensitive Demand

Zhao

et al. 2020

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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After-sales service contract is widely popular in business. Although both the cases of manufacturer offering warranty and retailer offering warranty are common in market, the differences between them have been few studied. In this paper, we build a two-echelon supply chain in which a manufacturer produces limit quality products and sells them to a retailer. To promote sales, the manufacturer or retailer offers a free-replacement warranty to the customers. Customer’s demand is affected by the warranty length. We investigate the game relationships between the supply chain members. We find that the warranty length negatively relates to the product quality in both the manufacturer offering warranty case and the retailer offering warranty case. When retailer’s profit margin is not low, the retailer offers a longer warranty than the manufacturer and vice versa. Profit of the supply chain is also analyzed along with a numerical study.

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Proposing a delay in payment contract for coordinating a two-echelon periodic review supply chain with stochastic promotional effort dependent demand

Cited by 45 publications

References 27 publications

Proposing channel coordination and horizontal cooperation in two competitive three‐echelon reverse supply chains

Proposing channel coordination and horizontal cooperation in two competitive three‐echelon reverse supply chains

Coordination of elderly healthcare service supply chain with information asymmetry: Designs of option contracts under different demand distribution statuses

Game Theoretic Analysis of After-Sales Service in Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Warranty Sensitive Demand

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