War 2008
DOI: 10.1017/cbo9780511840982.008
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Proportionality and Necessity

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Cited by 26 publications
(13 citation statements)
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“…67 It is quite true that not every beneficial effect of a course of action may serve to augment its proportionality, as Thomas Hurka has argued. 68 If we take this principle and apply it to the justice of prosecuting a war at all-ius ad bellum-then, for example, the fact that fighting in 1941-45 lifted the U.S.A. out of the economic depression of the 1930s may not be used to contribute to its justification. This is because economic depression, though an evil, is not (usually) an injustice, and so cannot count as a just cause for embarking on war against a non-culpable people.…”
Section: Ius In Bello: Disproportion As Profligate Attritionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…67 It is quite true that not every beneficial effect of a course of action may serve to augment its proportionality, as Thomas Hurka has argued. 68 If we take this principle and apply it to the justice of prosecuting a war at all-ius ad bellum-then, for example, the fact that fighting in 1941-45 lifted the U.S.A. out of the economic depression of the 1930s may not be used to contribute to its justification. This is because economic depression, though an evil, is not (usually) an injustice, and so cannot count as a just cause for embarking on war against a non-culpable people.…”
Section: Ius In Bello: Disproportion As Profligate Attritionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…If the nation is trying to prevent terrorist attacks like those of September 11, 2001, then tragic though the result will be, and assuming the nation makes serious efforts to minimize collateral harm, it may kill somewhat more enemy civilians if that is unavoidable in saving a smaller number of its own. 42 Hurka's wish for more precision is precisely the problem here. It is a wish for unambiguous, action-guiding judgements about war, judgements that no longer leave any space for interpretation and disagreement, for doubt and agony: for the recognition of war's tragedy.…”
Section: Fragility I: the Injustice Of Justified Warmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The second (‘traditional’) approach is also the dominant one in international law: it distinguishes between those who are and those who are not engaged in combat, irrespective of the side for which they fight, and allocates the same privileges and liabilities to both. Not only is this view supported in the ‘Orthodox’ view on the morality of the just war, but even among theorists of moral asymmetry, many endorse it as the most suitable framework for the law of war at the present time on grounds of moral pragmatism (Coady, 2008a, p. 164; Hurka, 2008, p. 45; McMahan, 2008, pp. 27–8; 2009, p. 234).…”
Section: Discrimination and The Legal Liability Of Just Combatantsmentioning
confidence: 99%