Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons

Kalai, Ehud

doi:10.2307/1913954

Cited by 651 publications

(453 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

446

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Both fail Scale Invariance. The Egalitarian solution E has solution outcome for S as the point (E S , E S ) ∈ S that maximizes E S (Kalai, 1977;Roth, 1977). Regardless of how asymmetric S is, E S is always on the 45 o line.…”

Section: The Bargaining Problem and Solution Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nash demand game and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution

Anbarcı¹,

Boyd²

2011

Games and Economic Behavior

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. We introduce two new variations on the Nash demand game. One, like all known Nash-like demand games so far, has the Nash solution outcome as its equilibrium outcome. In the other, the range of solutions depends on an exogenous breakdown probability; surprisingly, the Kalai-Smorodinsky outcome proves to be the most robust equilibrium outcome. While the KalaiSmorodinsky solution always finishes on top, there is no possible general ranking among the remaining solution concepts considered; in fact, the rest of the solution concepts take their turns at the bottom at various bargaining problems, depending on the specifics of the bargaining setup.

show abstract

Section: The Bargaining Problem and Solution Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nash demand game and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution

Anbarcı¹,

Boyd²

2011

Games and Economic Behavior

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The present paper is an atternpt to reconcile sorne of the principIes contained in Bargaining Theory with the work of J. Roemer by showing that E. Kalai's characterization [4] of the egalitarian solution can be transplanted from classical Bargaining Theory into sorne economically meaningfuI environments.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 83%

Welfarism in Economic Domains

Ginés¹,

Marhuenda²

2000

Journal of Economic Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In economies with pub1ic goods, and agents with quasi-linear preferences, we give a characterization of the welfare egalitarian correspondence in terms of three axioms: Pareto optimality, symmetry, and solidarity. This last property requires that an increase in the willingness to pay for the public goods of some of the agents should not decrease the welfare 01' any of them. Journal ol Economic Literature Classitication Numbers: 063; H41.

show abstract

“…There is an extensive literature studying the welfare-egalitarian solutions in the classical bargaining theory (Kalai, 1977;Thomson, 1983 etc. ) and several other settings such as production and exchange economies (for references, see Gines andMarhuenda, 2000 andSprumont, 1996).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information

Yengin¹

2012

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In the problem of assigning indivisible goods and monetary transfers, we characterize welfareegalitarian mechanisms (that are decision-efficient and incentive compatible) with an axiom of solidarity under preference changes and a fair ranking axiom of order preservation. This result is in line with characterizations of egalitarian rules with solidarity in other economic models. We also show that we can replace order-preservation with egalitarian-equivalence or no-envy (on the subadditive domain) and still characterize the welfare-egalitarian class. However, if we weaken order preservation to symmetry, mechanisms that are not welfare-egalitarian exist. We also study upper bounds on deficit and welfare lower bounds that characterize subclasses of the welfare-egalitarian class. JEL Classifications: C79, D61, D63.

show abstract

Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons

Cited by 651 publications

References 0 publications

Nash demand game and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution

Nash demand game and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution

Welfarism in Economic Domains

Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About