Property Rights versus “Public Necessity”: A Perspective on Emergency Powers and the Supreme Court

Abstract

Chief Justice Earl Warren once wrote that a free government is continuously "on trial for its life." 1 And never are the foundations of constitutional liberties more fragile than in periods of emergency, when government invokes extraordinary powers. Invariably, emergency powers involve the immediate curtailment of some rights; at their extreme in martial law, they can warrant an entire suspension of normal civilian governmental functions, as well as full suspension of dueprocess guarantees. 2 Once the constitutional fabric has been stretched to accommodate urgent public necessity in such situations, moreover, restoration to its earlier condition is not automatic or inevitable. On the contrary, as Justice Robert Jackson presciently warned, once the Supreme Court validates as constitutional the abridgement of essential rights during an emergency-and especially when the Court does so in relation to "the vague, undefined and undefinable 'war power"'-any principle that is thus articulated to justify such emergency action "then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need." 3