Property rights for the poor: Effects of land titling

Galiani, Sebastián; Schargrodsky, Ernesto

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.06.002

Cited by 489 publications

(268 citation statements)

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“…Other studies, however, cast doubt on the existence of a systematic influence of land tenure security on investment, and emphasize that informal rights may provide stable entitlements (Brasselle, Gaspart and Platteau, 2002). 5 The effects of titling on residential investment are consistent with those from a "natural experiment" analysis of the allocation of property rights in Argentina (Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2005).…”

mentioning

confidence: 81%

Village Political Economy, Land Tenure Insecurity, and the Rural to Urban Migration Decision: Evidence from China

Giles

Ren

2014

Policy Research Working Papers

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu This paper investigates the impact of land tenure insecurity on the migration decisions of China's rural residents. A simple model first frames the relationship among these variables and the probability that a reallocation of land will occur in the following year. After first demonstrating that a village leader's support for administrative land reallocation carries with it the risk of losing a future election, the paper exploits election-timing and village heterogeneity in lineage group composition and demographic change to identify the effect of land security. In response to an expected land reallocation in the following year, the probability that a rural resident migrates out of the county declines by 2.8 percentage points, which accounts for 17.5 percent of the annual share of village residents, aged 16 to 50, who worked as migrants during the period. This finding underscores the potential importance of secure property rights for facilitating labor market integration and the movement of labor out of agriculture. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SJEL Classification: O12, O15, J61, Q15, R23

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mentioning

confidence: 81%

Village Political Economy, Land Tenure Insecurity, and the Rural to Urban Migration Decision: Evidence from China

Giles

Ren

2014

Policy Research Working Papers

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“…Owning land titles also increases the likelihood of agriculture investments. Compared to landless hired laborers or tenants, land owners are more likely to invest in their property, for example, by buying modern technology such as tractors or fertilizers, as shown by Galiani and Schargrodsky (2006). Furthermore, these last two authors show that land titling affects fertility and reduces a household's size.…”

Section: The Argumentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cana, café, cacau: agrarian structure and educational inequalities in Brazil

Wegenast

2010

RHE / JILAEH

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The present paper explores the relationship between agrarian structure and human capital formation between and within Brazil's federal units. It is argued that whether states' agriculture is in plantation style, based on cheap coerced labor, or organized around family farming matters for the formulation of educational policies. According to the main claim, landlords were not interested in paying higher taxes to educate the masses and curtailed the expansion of schooling in order to keep a cheap workforce and maintain their monopoly over the decision-making process. Describing several episodes in Brazil's history of public instruction, the paper stresses the distributional conflicts over education as well as the rural aristocracy's resistance towards broadly-targeted, citizenship-enhancing educational policies. The descriptive evidence is complemented by statistical analyses employing historical as well as more recent data. It is shown that states characterized by a more egalitarian land distribution, which are not under RESUMENEl presente artículo estudia la relació n entre la estructura agraria y la formació n de capital humano, tanto dentro como entre las unidades federales de Brasil. Se argumenta que la agricultura de los Estados es de estilo plantació n -basado en mano de obra forzada barata, o por el contrario organizada alrededor de la granja familiar -es crucial para la formulació n de las políticas educativas. De acuerdo a esta hipó tesis, los propietarios de la tierra no estaban interesados en pagar impuestos má s altos para educar a las masas y restringieron la expansió n escolar con la intenció n de mantener una mano de obra barata y el monopolio del proceso de toma de decisiones. A través de la descripció n de distintos episodios de la historia de la instrucció n pú blica en Brasil, el artículo muestra los conflictos distributivos sobre la educació n y la resistencia de la aristocracia rural en relació n con los má s amplios objetivos ciudadanos para intensificar las políticas educativas. La evidencia descriptiva se complementa con el aná lisis estadístico de datos histó ricos y recientes. Se muestra que los Estados con una distribució n má s igualitaria de la tierra, que no está n bajo el dominio de poderosos propietarios de la tierra, tuvieron una mejor cobertura y calidad educativa. Asimismo, demostramos que invirtieron má s en escolarizació n.Palabras clave: desigualdad de tierra, latifundistas, educació n, Brasil

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“…The typical approach in the existing applied literature has been to assess the effects of property rights improvements by regressing measures of loan size, interest rates and productivity on improvements in property rights (see, for example, Torero, 2008 andGaliani andSchargrodsky, 2010). Proposition 4 provides a theoretical underpinning for this.…”

Section: Applicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentives and the De Soto Effect

Besley

Burchardi²,

Ghatak

2012

The Quarterly Journal of Economics

117

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This paper explores the consequences of improving property rights to facilitate the use of fixed assets as collateral, popularly attributed to the influential policy advocate Hernando de Soto. We use an equilibrium model of a credit market with moral hazard to characterize the theoretical effects, and also develop a quantitative analysis using data from Sri Lanka. We show that the effects are likely to be non-linear and heterogeneous by wealth group. They also depend on the extent of competition between lenders. There can be significant increases in profits and reductions in interest rates when credit markets are competitive. However, since these are due to reductions in moral hazard, i.e. increased effort, the welfare gains tend to be modest when cost of effort is taken into account. Allowing for an extensive margin where borrowers gain access to the credit market, can make these effects larger depending on the underlying wealth distribution.

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Property rights for the poor: Effects of land titling

Cited by 489 publications

References 45 publications

Village Political Economy, Land Tenure Insecurity, and the Rural to Urban Migration Decision: Evidence from China

Village Political Economy, Land Tenure Insecurity, and the Rural to Urban Migration Decision: Evidence from China

Cana, café, cacau: agrarian structure and educational inequalities in Brazil

Incentives and the De Soto Effect

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