1990
DOI: 10.1086/261729
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

47
2,389
3
51

Year Published

1999
1999
2014
2014

Publication Types

Select...
4
4

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 4,210 publications
(2,560 citation statements)
references
References 18 publications
47
2,389
3
51
Order By: Relevance
“…The first incentives component is the private ownership. The basis is the property-rights theory of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), which was applied to public service contracting by Hart, Schleifer and Vishny (1997).…”
Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The first incentives component is the private ownership. The basis is the property-rights theory of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), which was applied to public service contracting by Hart, Schleifer and Vishny (1997).…”
Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The controversy has concerned services ranging from education, job placement services and healthcare to transportation and garbage collection. One motivation for privatisation is to induce incentives for innovation and cost reduction (Grossman and Hart 1986;Hart and Moore 1990;Hart et al 1997). As pointed out by Hart et al (1997), however, incentives to engage in pure cost reduction may be too strong, which could deter the quality of the services.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…PRT studies the role of firm boundaries in providing incentives for making relationship-specific investments (Grossman and Hart 1986;Hart and Moore 1990). A firm is composed of assets that it owns.…”
Section: Property Rights Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This case relates directly to some recent papers on the theory of the …rm (see Hart & Moore (1990), Hart & Moore (1996) and Roberts & Steen (2000), where the initial members of the control group …nd it advantageous to include suppliers of …rm speci…c human capital). But the general principles operate whether we are considering externalities or suppliers of …rm-speci…c inputs.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 69%
“…If for some reason we assume that such a mechanism cannot be used, then the control group will be constrained to use an ine¢ cient (in the …rst best sense) mechanism. This is the central message of Bolton & Xu (1999), Hart & Moore (1990) and Roberts & Steen (2000).…”
Section: A Existence and E¢ Ciencymentioning
confidence: 75%