Property rights and methods of nomocratic planning

Zeković

et al. 2017

Spatium

This paper studies the changing roles of planning and the market in the context of urban growth and suburbanization in the capitals of Serbia and Bulgaria, specifically with regard to the socio-economic changes experienced in Southeast Europe over the past decades. With a focus on the post-socialist period, the work also examines specific features of the socialist period, so as to make important distinctions between the two. The research question in this paper is: Is planning or the market responsible for the form of growth that has occurred in Sofia and Belgrade? One methodological problem for the study is that in reality, most urban processes are to a degree both market driven and centrally planned. Thus, it can be difficult to distinguish between the distinct roles and outcomes of planning and the market. To solve this problem, the paper analyzes situations in which either planning or the market is dominant, so as to be able to clearly determine the impact of each mechanism on the resultant development. The paper concludes that urban growth and suburbanization are generally engendered by market forces, whereas the role of planning is to improve and refine the action of the market. When planning ignores the market, it results in failed or inefficient urban forms. However when planning is absent, urban development fails to meet reasonable standards.

Section: Methodological Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The changing roles of planning and the market in the processes of urban growth in Belgrade and Sofia

Kovachev

Zeković

et al. 2017

Spatium

“…The role of the excess amount is important, but it is only a criterion: it does not explain why individuals would choose private or collective entitlements, that is, what the associated benefits and costs are. The key benefit of private/individual entitlements is their high performance and efficiency (Slaev, 2016a; Slaev and Collier, 2018). Private/individual management of resources is efficient because all interests and all efforts and capabilities used to manage resources belong to one and the same individual or entity.…”

Section: Understanding Common Ownership In Light Of Buchanan’s Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Complex private-common property rights in institutional and planning theories

2019

Planning Theory

Self Cite

This research focuses on a substantial gap between theories of institutions and property rights: institutions are accepted as complex social structures, but property rights are generally considered as simple, that is, either private or public. Although usually unacknowledged, this simplified understanding of property rights is actually based on Samuelson’s theory developed six decades ago. According to Samuelson, the inherent characteristics of goods determine whether they are privately or collectively consumed commodities. Although Samuelson does not propose a mandatory unambiguous link between types of consumption and types of ownership, his theory implies that in principle, private goods are consumed and owned privately and public goods are consumed and owned publicly. Thus, in Samuelson’s theory, institutions are redundant. This article maintains that people need institutions and organisations because resources are scarce, and most resources are too expensive for individual use/consumption. To access such resources, people form groups and create organisations and institutions, thereby reducing the individual costs of use and consumption. As complex systems, institutions generate complex property rights – common/collective to the members of an organisation, but private to that organisation (the union of members). Furthermore, institutions determine the patterns of interaction between planning and the market (as the two main mechanisms of exercising property rights) at all levels of the multilevel structure of organisations and society. The article argues that Buchanan’s theory of clubs offers a more accurate explanation of the nature of property rights as relevant to institutions.

“…This allocation is realized through the adoption of rules, and this is the main "technological" feature of collective management. The proper method of management employed by partners, groups and communities is the nomocratic method (Moroni, 2007(Moroni, , 2010Slaev, 2016b). In contrast to the strict approach of teleocratic management, nomocratic management uses more general rules that allow the individual members a range of freedom.…”

Section: Managing Shared/collective/common Resourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Managing natural resources: Coasean bargaining versus Ostromian rules of common governance

Environmental Science & Policy

Collier

2018

The purpose of this paper is to explore the forms of ownership over natural resources according to the theories of Coase and Ostrom. Coase's work is regarded as a theoretical basis for establishing private ownership over natural resources, whereas Ostrom's theory is considered the most influential one supporting common/collective ownership. The key research question of the paper is whether the two theories are indeed opposite and contradictory. The novelty of our approach is that we account for the nature of common property rights in light of Buchanan's theory of clubs, thereby showing that the opposition between the concepts of Coase and Ostrom is exaggerated. The point is that ownership is generally considered only in its most extreme formspurely private and purely public. By referring to Buchanan, we show that in contexts of common/collective entitlements with varying degrees of publicness/privateness, Coasean bargaining and Ostromian rules of common/collective governance can coexist and work together effectively. On this basis, this research proposes a framework for defining policies for managing natural resources.