Property Rights and Finance

Johnson, Simon; McMillan, John; Woodruff, Christopher

doi:10.3386/w8852

Cited by 200 publications

(295 citation statements)

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“…2 This has put institutions squarely on the policy agenda, remaining methodological challenges notwithstanding (Przeworski 2004, Bardhan 2005, Third, use of firm level data provides an option to overcome the econometric and substantive limitations inherent in cross-country regressions. For Eastern European countries, the fact that firms reinvest their retained earnings in situations where property rights are strong but do not do so in environments characterized by weak property rights is interpreted as providing support to the hypothesis that property rights are more important than financing constraints (Johnson et al 2002). This is in line with the much greater relevance of property rights as compared to contracting institutions on economic growth that emerged from cross-country regressions (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005).…”

Section: The Importance Of Secure Property Rights and The Challenge Osupporting

confidence: 69%

Securing Property Rights In Transition: Lessons From Implementation Of China's Rural Land Contracting Law

Deininger¹

2008

Policy Research Working Papers

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Section: The Importance Of Secure Property Rights and The Challenge Osupporting

confidence: 69%

Securing Property Rights In Transition: Lessons From Implementation Of China's Rural Land Contracting Law

Deininger¹

2008

Policy Research Working Papers

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“…26 When the protection of property rights is eroded, a first effect is to reduce the profits pertaining to productive entrepreneurship. 27 For instance, business owners will retain a smaller share of profits in their firms (Johnson et al 2002). A further effect is that entrepreneurship takes new forms, since opportunities to earn profits from unproductive entrepreneurship arise.…”

Section: Institutions and High-growth Firmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competencies and Institutions Fostering High-growth Firms

Henrekson

Johansson

2007

FNT in Entrepreneurship

105

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High-growth firms (HGFs) are critical for net job creation and economic growth. We analyze HGFs using the theory of competence blocs, linking firm growth to property rights and the interaction of complementary expertise. Specifically, we discuss how the institutional framework affects the prevalence and performance of HGFs. Firm growth is viewed as resulting from the perpetual discovery and use of productive knowledge. A key element in this process is the competence bloc, a nexus of economic actors with complementary competencies that are vital in order to generate and commercialize novel ideas. The institutional framework determines the incentives for these individuals to acquire and utilize knowledge. We identify a number of institutions that foster the emergence of competence blocs and the creation of HGFs. In particular, our analysis points to the pivotal roles played by tax structures, labor market regulation, and the contestability of currently closed service markets. Finally, we characterize institutions beneficial for sclerotic or dynamic capitalism, respectively, depending on whether they provide a favorable environment for the emergence of competence blocs and the creation of HGFs.

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“…The breadth of the country of origin of the firm sample also merits highlighting as there is only limited comparable work which has drawn upon a range of countries focused upon small businesses in emerging economies (Chhakravarty & Xiang, 2011). Other empirical work in this area focused upon post-communist countries (Johnson, et al, 2002) and Chinese firms in 2002 (Cull & Xu, 2005).…”

Section: Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Institutional factors have been acknowledged as significant for reinvestment decisions (Cull & Xu, 2005;Johnson, McMillan, & Woodruff, 2002) as well as repatriation of earnings (Lundan, 2006). Although Cull & Xu (2005) found that contract enforcement did impact upon reinvestment, they did not explore this within additional dimensions of corruption.…”

Section: Reinvestment Choicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Context, law and reinvestment decisions: Why the transitional periphery differs from other post-state socialist economies

Demirbağ

McGuinnness

Wood

et al. 2015

International Business Review

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A range of studies has found that corruption has a significant impact upon FDI decisions, however to date there has been scant investigation into longer term investments made by firms and their relative proclivity to reinvest. Further, there is particularly little work on reinvestment choices made on the transitional periphery of post-state socialist countries and how these might differ from the more stable transitional economies of central and EasternEurope. Utilising 2005 World Bank Enterprise Survey data, this study explores the relationship between corruption and MNEs' strategic decision to reinvest profits. From an institutionalist starting point, we find variation in the impact of different dimensions of corruption upon reinvestment; pervasive corruption impacts negatively upon reinvestment, but its effects are more pronounced in the transitional periphery. Perceived robust legal institutions have a positive correlation with reinvestment, but again, the negative effects are most pronounced on the transitional peripheral state socialist states. We ascribe this disparity to greater institutional fluidity, and explore why this context has particularly adverse effects.Finally, we find that firm level attributes of larger size and greater age play an important role in positive reinvestment decisions, appearing to mitigate the worst consequences of this fluidity.

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Property Rights and Finance

Cited by 200 publications

References 0 publications

Securing Property Rights In Transition: Lessons From Implementation Of China's Rural Land Contracting Law

Securing Property Rights In Transition: Lessons From Implementation Of China's Rural Land Contracting Law

Competencies and Institutions Fostering High-growth Firms

Context, law and reinvestment decisions: Why the transitional periphery differs from other post-state socialist economies

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