Property and Homelessness

Essert, Christopher

doi:10.1111/papa.12080

Cited by 15 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…5 The normative power of control I have in mind is similar to that proposed by Christopher Essert (2016). The purpose of this paper has been to lay the groundwork for proceeding with a view of ownership based on an institutional account of property that can begin to make sense of the continuity between the structure of rights of disposal over one's person and rights over objects, without ignoring the normatively significant points of differentiation between the two.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…The purpose of this paper has been to lay the groundwork for proceeding with a view of ownership based on an institutional account of property that can begin to make sense of the continuity between the structure of rights of disposal over one's person and rights over objects, without ignoring the normatively significant points of differentiation between the two. 5 The normative power of control I have in mind is similar to that proposed by Christopher Essert (2016). Essert argues that we ought to think of systems of property rights as justified on the basis of their necessity for protecting a person's normative control, lack of which would leave her open to domination.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…For an explanation of this within a Kantian framework, see Pallikkathayil (2017). 22 Compare Essert (2016) and Penner (1997). The circumstances under which a person may have acquired the means to survive may be morally arbitrary in the sense described above.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…21 The closest way to approximate this would be in a scenario where the person alienating her ownership powers over herself rendered herself unconscious for the duration of the alienation. 22 Compare Essert (2016) and Penner (1997). 23 Compare Mill (1966) and Nozick (1974).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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My body and other objects: The internal limits of self‐ownership

Carnegy‐Arbuthnott

2019

European J of Philosophy

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Common practices such as donating blood or selling hair assume rights of disposal over oneself that are similar to, if not indistinguishable from, property rights. However, a simple view of self‐ownership fails to capture relevant moral differences between parts of a person and other objects. In light of this, we require some account of the continuity in the form of ownership rights a person has over herself and other objects, which also acknowledges the normative differences between constitutive parts of a person, on the one hand, and external objects, on the other. This paper provides such an account by arguing that there are reasons internal to a general justification of property rights to limit the extent of powers included in ownership of different kinds of object, depending on how the person is situated in relation to them. Rejecting a typical Hohfeldian view of property as a univocal, gradable concept allows us to make space for a new approach to property and self‐ownership: one which can make sense of various uses of the body as property without entailing that our relation to those parts is exhaustively characterised by an ordinary property right.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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My body and other objects: The internal limits of self‐ownership

Carnegy‐Arbuthnott

2019

European J of Philosophy

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“…147 Indeed, without access to housing, an individual lacks a crucial means to live independently and on their own terms; they lack one of the most significant tools for protecting themselves against domination. 148…”

Section: Republicanism and Access To Housing: Concrete Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Freedom and Access to Housing: Three Conceptions

Skolnik

2018

WYAJ

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This article argues that our current understanding of the relationship between access to housing and liberty (or freedom) is limited. It contends that judicial decisions and existing legal theory are predominantly concerned with the connection between housing and the two conceptions of liberty famously advanced by Isaiah Berlin: positive liberty and negative liberty. The notion of positive freedom conceptualizes freedom as self-mastery, whereas negative liberty portrays freedom as non-interference. The central premise of this article is that the republican theory of freedom (or republicanism) provides new insight into the importance of access to housing in protecting liberty, most notably in contexts where the state regulates public property, such as in Canada and the United States. The republican theory of freedom defines liberty as non-domination, meaning the absence of others’ power to interfere with an individual’s life and actions. This article argues that we develop a more well-rounded grasp of the value of access to housing by understanding its role in protecting individuals against domination. This article concludes by setting out the four concrete ways that housing reduces domination and safeguards individual freedom in contexts where the state regulates public property. By combining the respective insights of positive liberty, negative liberty, and republican liberty, this article ultimately provides a more robust understanding of the importance of housing in protecting freedom.

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Regulatory Entrepreneurship, Fair Competition, and Obeying the Law

Hughes

2021

J Bus Ethics

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Some sharing economy firms have adopted a strategy of "regulatory entrepreneurship," openly violating regulations with the aim of rendering them dead letters. This article argues that in a democracy, regulatory entrepreneurship is a presumptively unethical business strategy. In all but the most corrupt political environments, businesses that seek to change their regulatory environment should do so through the democratic political process, and they should do so without using illegal business practices to build a political constituency. To show this, the article defends a qualified moral obligation for businesspeople to obey the law even in societies that fall short of ideal democracy and that are rife with economic injustice. Owners and managers of successful businesses have strong moral reasons to obey laws concerning resource allocation. Such laws include not only property law, but also tax laws, environmental regulations, and other laws that regulate businesses in competitive markets. The moral reasons to obey such laws apply even to laws that business leaders think unfair or inefficient, provided that the laws in question have reasonable, good faith defenders.

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Property and Homelessness

Cited by 15 publications

References 0 publications

My body and other objects: The internal limits of self‐ownership

My body and other objects: The internal limits of self‐ownership

Freedom and Access to Housing: Three Conceptions

Regulatory Entrepreneurship, Fair Competition, and Obeying the Law

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