Properties of Scoring Auctions

Asker, John; Cantillon, Estelle

doi:10.2139/ssrn.609146

“…In their recent paper, Asker and Cantillon (2008) highlight serious difficulties from the standpoint of identification 9 that in our settings would be even more complicated as observed scores do not reflect precise quality/technical characteristicsverifiable quality is one key assumption in their model -rather they arise from discretional evaluation of projects (unverifiable quality).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 96%

“…While theoretical works advanced the research on the properties of multidimensional procurements (Dagupta and Spulberg 1989, Che 1993, Branko 1997, Asker and Cantillon 2008, and studied the conditions under which scoring auctions can do better than other mechanisms (Asker and Cantillon 2006), empirical investigations on the role of scoring rules on bidding behavior are completely absent. In particular, how bidders effectively trade-off price and quality?…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Bidding for Complex Projects: Evidence from the Acquisitions of IT Services

Albano

¹

,

Dini

²

,

Zampino³

2008

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. (Consip S.p.A.) and Department of Economics, University of Bari Terms of use: Documents in Bidding for Complex Projects: Evidence From the Acquisitions of IT Services SummaryCompetitive bidding (as auctions) is commonly used to procure goods and services. Public buyers are often mandated by law to adopt competitive procedures to ensure transparency and promote full competition. Recent theoretical literature, however, suggests that open competition can perform poorly in allocating complex projects. In exploring the determinants of suppliers' bidding behavior in procurement auctions for complex IT services, we find results that are consistent with theory. We find that price and quality do not exhibit the classical tradeoff one would expect: quite surprisingly, high quality is associated to low prices. Furthermore, while quality is mainly driven by suppliers' experience, price is affected more by the scoring rule and by the level of expected competition. These results might suggest that (scoring) auctions fail to appropriately incorporate buyers' complex price/quality preferences in the tender design.

show abstract

“…For quantifying the customer satisfaction for a certain configuration, we introduce the notion of a scoring function [3]. The scoring function maps the customer preferences on certain configuration choices to a real number in the interval [0, 1].…”

Section: Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards Custom Cloud Services

Haak

¹

,

Grimm

²

2011

The Semanic Web: Research and Applications

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. In today's highly dynamic economy, businesses have to adapt quickly to market changes, be it customer, competition-or regulationdriven. Cloud computing promises to be a solution to the ever changing computing demand of businesses. Current SaaS, PaaS and IaaS services are often found to be too inflexible to meet the diverse customer requirements regarding service composition and Quality-of-Service. We therefore propose an ontology-based optimization framework allowing Cloud providers to find the best suiting resource composition based on an abstract request for a custom service. Our contribution is three-fold. First, we describe an OWL/SWRL based ontology framework for describing resources (hard-and software) along with their dependencies, interoperability constraints and meta information. Second, we provide an algorithm that makes use of some reasoning queries to derive a graph over all feasible resource compositions based on the abstract request. Third, we show how the graph can be transformed into an integer program, allowing to find the optimal solution from a profit maximizing perspective.

show abstract

“…Following Che's (1993) seminal paper, some theoretical studies have looked into scoring auctions. Asker andCantillon (2008, 2010) are among the most cited ones. They show that scoring auctions dominate beauty contests, bargaining, and price-only auctions in most instances in terms of efficiency and social welfare.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The impact of scoring weights on price and quality outcomes: An application to the procurement of Welfare-to-Work contracts

Koning

¹

,

Meerendonk

²

2014

European Economic Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. This paper assesses the effects of changes in scoring weights in auctions, using a unique sample of biddings of private Welfare-to-Work (WTW) organizations to reintegrate groups of unemployed and disabled workers. WTW-organizations did not only bid on prices, but also received points for three proxies of the quality of their services: their reputation, a description of their intended methodology to reintegrate workers and the fraction of job placements they considered likely to achieve. We exploit the fact that the scoring weights of these items changed in the time period under consideration, while the broad classification of ('gross') worker types remained similar over time. Our estimation results show that increases in the scoring weights of the quality items result in higher price bids, particularly of WTW-firms that are bidding for the first time as entrants. For the WTW-firms that won the procurements, we find a higher weight for both the reputation and the methodology item to contribute to the job placement of workers.JEL Classification: D44, I38

show abstract

Properties of Scoring Auctions

Cited by 84 publications

References 26 publications

Bidding for Complex Projects: Evidence from the Acquisitions of IT Services

Bidding for Complex Projects: Evidence from the Acquisitions of IT Services

Towards Custom Cloud Services

The impact of scoring weights on price and quality outcomes: An application to the procurement of Welfare-to-Work contracts

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About