Propaganda and Skepticism

Abstract

Existing work on propaganda finds that its extremeness and effectiveness vary in sometimes puzzling ways in response to major environmental factors such as repression, diversion, and crisis. Formal models of propaganda generally examine these factors in isolation, rendering a comprehensive understanding difficult; moreover, they often impose rationality assumptions at odds with experimental findings. I propose a behavioral game-theoretic model of propaganda in which, consistent with psychology research, citizens are cognitively constrained and their skepticism toward propaganda is endogenous. These cognitive constraints generate a trade-off for the propagandist between motivating extreme action through extreme statements and triggering citizen skepticism. I then incorporate repression, diversion, and crisis into the model. I synthesize, and explain, empirical findings on the relationships between these factors by showing how each affects both the citizen's level of skepticism and the propagandist's calculus.

Message or Messenger? Source and Labeling Effects in Authoritarian Response to Protest

“…This comports with findings that the threat of repression reduces citizens’ skepticism and use of more cognitively demanding System II thinking (Horz, 2018).…”

“…It is exactly in this highly censored media environment that citizens frequently observe nongovernment sources that are labeled as anti-regime. 16 Again, our study aims at examining if 14 This comports with findings that the threat of repression reduces citizens' skepticism and use of more cognitively-demanding System II thinking (Horz 2018). 15 For example, see a column at Sohu.com: http://star.news.sohu.com/s2012/mjzl/ 16 For instance, people are easily accused as "hostile forces" and even bullied by Chinese netizens even if they post negative opinions about the government or the country on not very sensitive topics (China Media Project 2021).…”

The Political Legacy of Entertainment TV

“…Hence, we identify the effect from the residual variation in signal strength due to idiosyncratic geographic factors within narrow areas, which is uncorrelated with both past electoral outcomes and a wide range of municipal characteristics. 3 We find that municipalities exposed to Mediaset prior to 1985 displayed higher support for Berlusconi's party, Forza Italia, when he first ran for election in 1994, compared to municipalities that were exposed only later on. This effect is non-negligible, about 1 percentage point, and it is precisely estimated and robust across different specifications.…”

Modern Political Economy: A Brief History and Some Applications

“…Political economy themes using game theory is also suffused in the mainstream, flagship journals across the social sciences. See, for example, Prendergast (2007) in the American Economic Review, Parameswaran et al (2021) in the American Political Science Review, Horz (2021) in the American Journal of Political Science, or Swedberg (2001) for a summary of the use of game theory in sociology up until that time.…”