Propaganda and Signaling

Huang, Haifeng

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2325101

Cited by 40 publications

(63 citation statements)

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“…13 "Bawo hao zheng zhi jia ban bao de shidai yaoqiu," Renmin Ribao, March 21, 2016. 14 See, e.g., King et al (2013), Pan and Chen (2018), Huang (2015b), Brady (2009). 15 Slantchev (2006).…”

Section: Mass Audiences and Authoritarian Regimesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China

Weiss

Dafoe

2019

International Studies Quarterly

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How do government rhetoric and propaganda affect mass reactions in international crises? Using two scenario-based survey experiments in China, one hypothetical and one that selectively reminds respondents of recent events, we assess how government statements and propaganda impact Chinese citizens’ approval of their government's performance in its territorial and maritime disputes. We find evidence that citizens disapprove more of inaction after explicit threats to use force, suggesting that leaders can face public opinion costs akin to audience costs in an authoritarian setting. However, we also find evidence that citizens approve of bluster—vague and ultimately empty threats—suggesting that talking tough can provide benefits, even in the absence of tough action. In addition, narratives that invoke future success to justify present restraint increase approval, along with frames that emphasize a shared history of injustice at the hands of foreign powers.

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“…13 "Bawo hao zheng zhi jia ban bao de shidai yaoqiu," Renmin Ribao, March 21, 2016. 14 See, e.g., King et al (2013), Pan and Chen (2018), Huang (2015b), Brady (2009). 15 Slantchev (2006).…”

Section: Mass Audiences and Authoritarian Regimesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China

Weiss

Dafoe

2019

International Studies Quarterly

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“…On the other hand, the findings also reveal the uniqueness of the informal education impact when compared to regular propaganda channels, especially formal education. As shown in the empirical tests, the obedience‐enforcement effect apparent in formal education does not explain the impact of PEDBs (Huang, ).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…According to this theory, instead of enhancing the positive attitudes of the public toward the government, propaganda shows the government's power to prevent protests. Huang () illustrated this theory with an experimental study of formal education in China. The study found that the Chinese college students who were predominantly taught formal political knowledge (the treatment group) were not more satisfied with the government but held a stronger belief in its ability to maintain political order, compared to the control group in which the knowledge was not taught.…”

Section: Propagandistic Impact Of Informal Education: Three Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Are Informal Education Facilities Effective Means for Generating Political Support? A Spatial Analysis*

2019

Social Science Quarterly

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Objective Informal education based on public facilities, such as museums and memorials, is an important propaganda practice in authoritarian countries. However, the empirical research on this area is underdeveloped and relies on small and potentially biased samples. Method This study collects unique spatial opinion data of over 300 such informal education facilities in China merged with original survey data and conducts a systematic evaluation of this form of propaganda. Result The statistical results challenge the conventional expectation that more exposure to the informal education facilities would improve the citizens' support of and obedience to the government. Conclusion The findings reveal a backfire effect of informal education facilities in that more exposure to them reduces both citizens' political support and obedience.

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“…The participants quickly adopted their social roles, with the guards behaving brutally toward the prisoners, and the prisoners becoming passive and deferential. 18 For two recent publications on government censorship of internet posts and the use of propaganda to control information flow in China, see King et al (2013) and Huang (2015).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collective Resistance under Authoritarianism: Elite–Mass Strategies in an Experimental Game

2016

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We create a collective resistance game in which elites control the distribution of resources if the masses are compliant. However, if the masses unanimously protest elite allocations, they can capture a greater share of resources for themselves. We study how Chinese villagers, randomly assigned to the role of elites and masses, play this game in repeated interactions under varying information conditions. We find significant variation in the extent to which participants gave weight in their decisions to (1) the amount of the elite allocation and (2) their beliefs about the likely choices of fellow group members. Many individuals made their decisions based primarily on the size of the elite allocation, choosing to protest if the elite offer fell below some threshold level. Only a small proportion of the respondents were attuned consistently to the behavioral intentions of fellow group members in deciding whether to protest the elite allocation. This heterogeneity of preferences among participants has significant implications for their prospects of achieving and sustaining collective action. Knowledge of the amount of resources controlled by elites at the start of the game affected mass calculations of the fairness of distributions and increased the frequency of mass protests. However, the elites exploited the decision rule of many mass members by buying off those individuals with the lowest thresholds, thus preempting or dissolving collective action. This research sheds light on elite-mass interactions under authoritarianism, and in particular on contentious politics in contemporary China.Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (

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Propaganda and Signaling

Cited by 40 publications

References 0 publications

Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China

Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China

Are Informal Education Facilities Effective Means for Generating Political Support? A Spatial Analysis*

Collective Resistance under Authoritarianism: Elite–Mass Strategies in an Experimental Game

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