Proofs of Restricted Shuffles

Terelius, Björn; Wikström, Douglas

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-12678-9_7

Cited by 61 publications

(85 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Thus, for each g i one could use a precomputed table of values (x, g x i ) for all possible values of x. Mix net matrix commitments Given the mix net scheme in [20], a substantial part of the computations can be performed without the knowledge of ciphertexts that are about to be shuffled. We therefore assume, that the voting system performs precomputations that would allow to shuffle the votes from all eligible voters.…”

Section: Time Estimationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In order to provide robustness against faulty mix nodes, a reencryption mix net scheme is used, and for ensuring that the ciphertexts are shuffled correctly and not replaced by manipulated votes, the proof of shuffle is attached by each mix node. We chose to include the proof of shuffle suggested by [20,22] due to it being to our knowledge the most efficient algorithm, the implementation and detailed specification of which is available for open usage [23]. For the mix net scheme, the efficiency of calculating the proof of shuffle for C ciphertexts in terms of exponentiations is (C + 2)RExp + 2C · M Exp(2) + M Exp(C + 1) for the offline phase (i.e.…”

Section: Netmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For the calculations we used the formulas for homomorphic tallying approaches mentioned in Section 3.2, mix net scheme from [20,22], as mentioned in Section 3.1, and verifiable decryption scheme mentioned in Section 3.3. Upon entering the input (see Figure 1), the tool computes the execution time needed for each one of the available schemes, as explained in Section 2.…”

Section: Softwarementioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Efficiency Comparison of Various Approaches in E-Voting Protocols

Kulyk

Volkamer

2016

Financial Cryptography and Data Security

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Abstract. In order to ensure the security of remote Internet voting, the systems that are currently proposed make use of complex cryptographic techniques. Since these techniques are often computationally extensive, efficiency becomes an issue. Identifying the most efficient Internet voting system is a non-trivial task -in particular for someone who does not have a sufficient knowledge on the systems that currently exist, and on the cryptographic components that constitute those systems. Aside from these components, the efficiency of Internet voting also depends on various parameters, such as expected number of participating voters and ballot complexity. In this paper we propose a tool for evaluating the efficiency of different approaches for an input scenario, that could be of use to election organizers deciding how to implement the voting system.

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Section: Time Estimationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Netmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Softwarementioning

confidence: 99%

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Efficiency Comparison of Various Approaches in E-Voting Protocols

Kulyk

Volkamer

2016

Financial Cryptography and Data Security

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“…Various perfect (or statistical) ZK proof of shuffles can be used for that purpose [23,25,35]: these guarantee that a simulator can produce a proof of shuffle just from the inputs and output of that shuffle that is indistinguishable from a real proof, even by an unbounded adversary.…”

Section: Ccva Encryption For Elections With Complex Ballotsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The commitment consistent shuffle approach proposed by Terelius and Wikström [36,35] seems particularly natural for that purpose. This approach splits the proof of shuffle in two stages.…”

Section: Ccva Encryption For Elections With Complex Ballotsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Election Verifiability or Ballot Privacy: Do We Need to Choose?

Cuvelier

Pereira

Peters

2013

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. We propose a new encryption primitive, commitment consistent encryption (CCE), and instances of this primitive that enable building the first universally verifiable voting schemes with a perfectly private audit trail (PPAT) and practical complexity. That is:-the audit trail that is published for verifying elections guarantees everlasting privacy, and -the computational load required from the participants is only increased by a small constant factor compared to traditional voting schemes, and is optimal in the sense of Cramer, Gennaro and Schoenmakers [16]. These properties make it possible to introduce election verifiability in large scale elections as a pure benefit, that is, without loss of privacy compared to a non-verifiable scheme and at a similar level of efficiency. We propose different approaches for constructing voting schemes with PPAT from CCE, as well as two efficient CCE constructions: one is tailored for elections with a small number of candidates, while the second is suitable for elections with complex ballots.

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Selective comparison of verifiable online voting systems

Finogina,

Cucurull Juan,

Costa

2024

Security and Privacy

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This paper aims to provide a guideline for identifying the most suitable online voting system under the given requirements and acceptable tradeoffs. We have selected twelve (more or less) well‐known online voting systems that rely on distinct cryptographic mechanisms for achieving security. For each of the systems, we summarized the key architectural and cryptographic ideas behind their design. Then, we analyzed the required trust assumptions for achieving the three most important security properties (i.e., verifiability, divided between cast‐as‐intended, recorded‐as‐cast, and tallied‐as‐recorded verifiabilities, privacy, and receipt‐freeness). To make a fair comparison, we did our analysis based on identical security definitions. Note that we selected wildly known and well‐accepted definitions, which are scheme‐neutral, to avoid any biases. Also, we discussed some of the most critical practical aspects of those systems, such as–the necessity for secure or anonymous channels, reliance on secure printer facilities and so forth. To facilitate the comparison, we suggested a unified naming convention for system elements based on their roles and functions. Then, based on the unified naming convention, we compared all twelve online voting systems for both the security properties and practical aspects. Finally, we summarized our observations regarding patterns and dependencies we observed, provided guidelines for selecting the online voting system, and gave recommendations regarding system design. We hope our work contributes to the online literature and facilitates the process of selecting the most suitable e‐voting system depending on the requirements of a specific election.

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Proofs of Restricted Shuffles

Cited by 61 publications

References 27 publications

Efficiency Comparison of Various Approaches in E-Voting Protocols

Efficiency Comparison of Various Approaches in E-Voting Protocols

Election Verifiability or Ballot Privacy: Do We Need to Choose?

Selective comparison of verifiable online voting systems

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