Promotion Incentives, GDP Manipulation and Economic Growth in China: How Does Sub-National Officials Behave When They Have Performance Pressure?

Zhou, Qiyao; Zeng, Jiangnan

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3269645

Cited by 9 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…One source of conflict is in the pursuit of economic development vis-à-vis nature conservation. For local governors, economic growth has long been the top priority since it offers the highest returns in their promotion decisions (Zhou and Zeng, 2018; Li et al ., 2019; Wang and Lei, 2021). Strictly enforcing protective regulations on nature reserves also means restricting economic activities such as farming and animal husbandry, real estate development and construction, mining, and forest logging (Ren et al ., 2015; Meara, 2021).…”

Section: Key Features Of China's Nature Reserve Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing the role of institutional effectiveness on carbon sequestration: the case of China's nature reserve policy

Chen

Fiankor

Kang

et al. 2023

CAER

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PurposeCarbon storage in protected land is a practical climate stabilization strategy. It is increasingly being recognized as an essential means of safeguarding biomass carbon and improving local ecological conditions. Yet, increasing soil carbon sequestration by setting aside nature reserves does not depend only on the scale of the reserve but more so on the implementation and enforcement of the reserve protection policy. This paper aims to discuss the aforementioned issues.Design/methodology/approachThe authors show how nature reserves established and managed by different administrative levels affect carbon sequestration. Empirically, the authors estimate a time-varying difference-in-difference model that exploits China's distinct four-layered hierarchical nature reserve management system at the county level.FindingsThe findings show that higher administrative level (i.e. national and provincial) nature reserves have no effects on the carbon dynamic. However, reserves managed by lower administrative levels (i.e. prefecture- and county-level) are associated with reduced carbon sequestration. The results imply local governments fail to fulfil their responsibilities for nature reserves protection, leading to increased extractive activities and declined ecological biomass. Research limitations/implicationsResponsibility and accountability mechanisms for the violation of the nature reserves requirements need to be stipulated accordingly. Greater emphasis should be placed on nature reserves at the base level. The central government should continue efforts toward the establishment of ad hoc and independent management agencies at the ground-management level that are free of influence from base-level governments.Originality/valueThe heterogeneity in the performance of nature reserves across administrative levels confirms that ecosystem service quality is highly dependent on establishment, management and supervision. This provides a better understanding of the socio-ecological interdependence of protected areas.

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Section: Key Features Of China's Nature Reserve Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing the role of institutional effectiveness on carbon sequestration: the case of China's nature reserve policy

Chen

Fiankor

Kang

et al. 2023

CAER

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“…2012), but in authoritarian regimes, information distortions tend to be especially severe due to the lack of free media or public accountability as alternative sources of information. The research on bureaucratic information manipulation in autocracies so far has focused primarily on the case of China (Fisman and Wang 2017;Merli and Raftery 2000;Wallace 2016;Zhou and Zeng 2018), where governmental incentives for local bureaucrats not only played an essential role in ensuring the high economic performance of the regime (Xu 2011), but also made data manipulation very attractive (Chen et al 2019). 8 We are interested, however, in settings where bureaucracies' objective is not to hide information from their political principals, but to manipulate the publicly available information in line with the goals of the principals, or at least what bureaucrats perceive to be the goals of the principals.…”

Section: Data Manipulation In Authoritarian Regimesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…3 Thus, to understand the patterns of data manipulation, we need to study this interaction and the interests of the actors involved. Previous literature has acknowledged the importance of bureaucratic incentives; yet, the primary focus has been on how bureaucracies misinform their principals and which tools authoritarian regimes establish to address this problem (see, for example, Wallace 2016;Zhou and Zeng 2018). The settings where autocrats create incentives encouraging data manipulation and their consequences for reported information have received much smaller scholarly attention (for a recent exception, see Tang, Wang and Yi 2022).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Encouraged to Cheat? Federal Incentives and Career Concerns at the Sub-national Level as Determinants of Under-Reporting of COVID-19 Mortality in Russia

Kofanov

Козлов²,

Libman

et al. 2022

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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This article investigates the determinants and consequences of manipulating COVID-19 statistics in an authoritarian federation using the Russian case. It abandons the interpretation of the authoritarian regime as a unitary actor and acknowledges the need to account for a complex interaction of various bureaucratic and political players to understand the spread and the logic of manipulation. Our estimation strategy takes advantage of a natural experiment where the onset of the pandemic adjourned the national referendum enabling new presidential terms for Putin. To implement the rescheduled referendum, Putin needed sub-national elites to manufacture favourable COVID-19 statistics to convince the public that the pandemic was under control. While virtually all regions engaged in data manipulation, there was a substantial variation in the degree of misreporting. A third of this variation can be explained by an asynchronous schedule of regional governors’ elections, winning which depends almost exclusively on support from the federal authorities.

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“…According to the Interim Provisions for Party and Government Leading Cadre Tenure, mayors below the age of 57 can be promoted to higher-level positions (Kou and Tsai, 2014). Zhou and Zeng (2018) also found that mayors who were below the age of 57 had stronger promotion incentives. If they cannot get promoted before this age, they are less likely to be promoted afterward and retire with relatively lower pension packages.…”

Section: Moderator Variablementioning

confidence: 99%

High-speed Railways and Environmental Pollution: The Mediating Effect of Environmental Regulations and Moderating Effect of Officials' Political Promotion Incentives

Wang

Chen

et al. 2021

Preprint

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This study examines the relationship between high-speed railways (HSRs) and environmental pollution by focusing on the mediating role of environmental regulations and the moderating role of officials’ political promotion incentives. Based on a sample of 113 prefecture-level cities, with balanced panel data in China from 2009 to 2017, using the difference-in-differences (DID) model, the results show that HSRs can reduce environmental pollution via the mediating effect of environmental regulations. Additionally, high officials’ political promotion incentives can strengthen this mediating effect. A propensity score matching with difference-in-differences (PSM-DID) model is used to solve endogenous problems, and a placebo test and a parallel trend test indicate that these results are robust. This study encourages the government to rationally promote the construction of high-speed railways and expand the social advantages of high-speed railways to improve environmental regulations and reduce environmental pollution.

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Promotion Incentives, GDP Manipulation and Economic Growth in China: How Does Sub-National Officials Behave When They Have Performance Pressure?

Cited by 9 publications

References 43 publications

Assessing the role of institutional effectiveness on carbon sequestration: the case of China's nature reserve policy

Assessing the role of institutional effectiveness on carbon sequestration: the case of China's nature reserve policy

Encouraged to Cheat? Federal Incentives and Career Concerns at the Sub-national Level as Determinants of Under-Reporting of COVID-19 Mortality in Russia

High-speed Railways and Environmental Pollution: The Mediating Effect of Environmental Regulations and Moderating Effect of Officials' Political Promotion Incentives

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