2015
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-09459-5
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Promoting Information in the Marketplace for Financial Services

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Cited by 6 publications
(3 citation statements)
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References 24 publications
(72 reference statements)
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“…Regulation of securities markets serves two goals. The first is to protect investors by decreasing the information asymmetry between investors, issuers and underwriters (Cattaneo et al 2015), allowing investors to make confident and informed investment decisions for which correct and material information is fundamental (Latimer and Maume 2014). The second goal is to eliminate an unfortunate allocation due to a market failure (Peltzman 1976).…”
Section: Institutional Changementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Regulation of securities markets serves two goals. The first is to protect investors by decreasing the information asymmetry between investors, issuers and underwriters (Cattaneo et al 2015), allowing investors to make confident and informed investment decisions for which correct and material information is fundamental (Latimer and Maume 2014). The second goal is to eliminate an unfortunate allocation due to a market failure (Peltzman 1976).…”
Section: Institutional Changementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Existing studies maintain that voluntary disclosure of non-financial information serves the purpose of reducing stakeholders' uncertainty regarding a firm's future cash flows and thus reduces the cost of capital (Botosan, 2006;Leuz and Wysocki, 2008), even in terms of potential of mis-pricing at the time of the IPO (Lev, 2001;Williams, 2001;Jog and McConomy, 2003;Guo et al, 2005;Leone et al, 2007;Hanley and Hoberg, 2012;Dambra et al, 2015;Boone et al, 2016). Nevertheless, although managers might have strong incentives to disclose non-financial information, they are under equal pressure to prevent or avoid such disclosure to protect a firm's competitive advantage (Verrecchia, 1983;Latimere and Maumere, 2015;Ding, 2016). In addition, the disclosure of information pertaining to intangibles is often believed to give rise to unnecessary costs (Mangena et al, 2010).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our findings have both theoretical and practical implications: we add to the literature devoted to understanding primary and secondary market investors' behavior in that we demonstrate how they differ in their reaction to intangibles information disclosure, thus taking a step forward in disproving the widespread opinion that such disclosure reduces investors' uncertainty regarding the future of the listing firm (Botosan, 2006;Leuz and Wysocki, 2008). In addition to this, being aware of what intangibles information disclosure is more effective for different categories of investors should help firms to tailor it to the needs of analysts and institutional investors in private channel communications and to make a differentiated selection of information for public channel communications through which firms address multiple audiences at the same time (Latimere and Maumere, 2015). This selective disclosure of information should help firms focus their efforts, thus reducing unnecessary costs.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%