Promising practices for delivery of court-supervised substance abuse treatment: Perspectives from six high-performing California counties operating Proposition 36

Abstract

Operative for nearly a decade, California's voter-initiated Proposition 36 program offers many offenders community-based substance abuse treatment in lieu of likely incarceration. Research has documented program successes and plans for replication have proliferated, yet very little is known about how the Proposition 36 program works or practices for achieving optimal program outcomes. In this article, we identify policies and practices that key stakeholders perceive to be most responsible for the successful delivery of court-supervised substance abuse treatment to offenders under Proposition 36. Data was collected via focus groups conducted with 59 county stakeholders in six high-performing counties during 2009. Discussion was informed by seven empirical indicators of program performance and outcomes and was focused on identifying and describing elements contributing to success. Program success was primarily attributed to four strategies, those that: (1) fostered program engagement, monitored participant progress, and sustained cooperation among participants; (2) cultivated buy-in among key stakeholders; (3) capitalized on the role of the court and the judge; and (4) created a setting which promoted a highquality treatment system, utilization of existing resources, and broad financial and political support for the program. Goals and practices for implementing each strategy are discussed. Findings provide a "promising practices" resource for Proposition 36 program evaluation and improvement and inform the design and study of other similar types of collaborative justice treatment efforts.

Jurisdictional Variation in the Economic Impact of California’s Proposition 36 Drug Offender Diversion Program

“…Indeed, variations in the SACPA population served, as well as in the effectiveness of communication between relevant county agencies, produced a broad range of SACPA effects, from a savings of $8,138 per offender to an increased cost of $3,163 per offender after adjustment for individual demographics and county-level variability. This finding fits well with previously published work revealing differences in SUD treatment outcomes such as recidivism and abstinence between different counties, as well as with previous work on differences in the level of inter-agency collaboration and the impact of such differences on program effectiveness [19].…”

“…Relationships may be further influenced by institutional settings [31,32], and they evolve over time. Similar processes have been identified as being salient within the SACPA environment [11,19,24,33]. In particular, the level of collaboration between SACPA's key stakeholders has been identified as a significant contextual element that greatly contributed to the program's success [19,24].…”

“…Jurisdictional, or county-level, variation has been reported in SACPA program operations [8,[18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25], characteristics of participating offenders [18], and outcomes [26].…”

“…Jurisdictional, or county-level, variation has been reported in SACPA program operations [8,[18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25], characteristics of participating offenders [18], and outcomes [26].The attitudes, training, and practices of key implementers impact the degree of success, or failure, of social policy initiatives [27], as does the nature of the linkages between cooperating agencies (i.e., exchanges of communication, trust, and resources) and the boundaries Methods: Administrative data were used to conduct multilevel, difference-in-differences analysis examining the effect of individual-and county-level variables on total service-utilization costs across eight domains over 30 months pre-and post-conviction.Results: County-level variability in the severity of offender populations served under SACPA and in the level of collaboration between SACPA stakeholders contributed to cost variability. More severe populations and less effective stakeholder communication produced increases in costs.…”

Offender Diversion Into Substance Use Disorder Treatment: The Economic Impact of California’s Proposition 36

“…The law was modeled after historical and concurrent offender diversion efforts, including the Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime programs, drug courts, and other diversion efforts and attempted to implement a program more broadly applicable than any previously implemented, in part by removing motivation and suitability criteria for participation. 23,24 SACPA eligibility criteria include a requirement of no previous or concurrent serious or violent felonies, physical injury misdemeanors, or concurrent nondrug charges. 25 …”