Promising ever more

Abstract

This study argues that three recent societal trends have increased parties' incentives to give election promises in campaigns: the increasing volatility of voters, the professionalization and marketization of politics, and the mediatization of politics. Arguments are empirically tested on the case of Sweden between 1991 and 2010. All promises presented in election manifestos by Swedish parliamentary parties are analyzed, enabling analyses of six elections, nine parties, 44 manifestos and almost 4000 election promises. We find that Swedish parties increased their pledge making considerably during the period, from an average of 46 per manifesto to 149. Specific promises have increased, as have the pledges that are unrelated to other parties' pledges. Altogether, the results point at an increasingly specific vote choice for voters.

(When) do electoral mandates set the agenda? Government capacity and mandate responsiveness in Germany

“…Significant incentives derive from the anticipation of electoral sanctions for inaction on their campaign priorities or for unauthorized policy reforms (Matthiess, 2020; Naurin et al., 2019b; Werner, 2019). Electoral platforms attract considerable attention, with journalists drawing up tables of the main campaign announcements or referring to such pledges as an important benchmark for assessing a government's record (Håkansson & Naurin, 2016, pp. 395–396).…”

Which Promises Actually Matter? Election Pledge Centrality and Promissory Representation

“…The salience approach to manifesto data has been critiqued as a measure of party emphasis (Laver, 2001; Lowe et al, 2011; Prosser, 2014) because it does not necessarily capture what is communicated to the public about the party’s agenda. Håkansson and Naurin (2016) find Swedish parties make more promises in issue areas of importance to the public, but that the proportion of promises devoted to these areas has decreased over time. In addition, even if promises in important issue areas receive more space in manifestos overall, voters care about which specific promises are kept within an issue area.…”

The Effect of Ministerial Instability on Government's Mandate Fulfilment: Evidence from the Portuguese Case

“…At the institutional level, findings essentially suggest that single‐party executives have the best performance regarding mandate fulfilment, whether in majority or not (Artés, 2011, p. 144–145; Klingemann et al, 1994; Moury & Fernandes, 2018; Royed, 1996; Thomson et al, 2017). Term duration has also been acknowledged as promoting the accomplishment of government party electoral programmes (Håkansson & Naurin, 2016; Thomson et al, 2017). Regarding the type of pledge, promises aiming at maintaining ‘status quo’ of policies have been demonstrated to be easier to fulfil as compared to ‘change’ pledges (i.e.…”

“…In spite of substantial variation across countries and executives, governments tend to fulfil their election pledges to a large extent (e.g. Artés, 2011; Håkansson & Naurin, 2016; Moury & Fernandes, 2018; Thomson et al, 2017). In research exploring the reasons underlying mandate fulfilment, emphasis has been placed on a limited number of factors, especially (although not exclusively) on the opposition between minority and majority governments (e.g.…”