2004
DOI: 10.1002/hrm.20001
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Promise and peril in implementing pay‐for‐performance

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Cited by 151 publications
(72 citation statements)
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References 34 publications
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“…In other words, strong motivational effects require reasonable financial investments from the respective company, in order to provide rewards large enough in order to be perceived by the employees as worthy of their high effort investments. The detrimental effect of the low budgets that companies are willing to allocate to their financial incentive programs on their efficiency has been already highlighted elsewhere (Beer and Cannon, 2004), while some investigations even showed that the allocation of low rewards for certain tasks can even dampen employees' motivation to perform them below its previous level, before these financial incentives had been introduced (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000). Our results also highlight the need for a fine-grained analysis in what regards the components of employee retribution, that would move beyond the individual amount of pay and that also takes into account other elements with potential motivational effects, such as pay dispersion.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 93%
“…In other words, strong motivational effects require reasonable financial investments from the respective company, in order to provide rewards large enough in order to be perceived by the employees as worthy of their high effort investments. The detrimental effect of the low budgets that companies are willing to allocate to their financial incentive programs on their efficiency has been already highlighted elsewhere (Beer and Cannon, 2004), while some investigations even showed that the allocation of low rewards for certain tasks can even dampen employees' motivation to perform them below its previous level, before these financial incentives had been introduced (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000). Our results also highlight the need for a fine-grained analysis in what regards the components of employee retribution, that would move beyond the individual amount of pay and that also takes into account other elements with potential motivational effects, such as pay dispersion.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 93%
“…Marketing departments have faced disruptions introducing sales force automation technology (see, e.g., Speier and Venkatesh (2002)). Human resource departments have faced disruptions in introducing new workplace compensation schemes (see, e.g., Beer and Cannon (2004)). And, of course, introducing new information technology systems often leads to significant disruptions (see, e.g., Ginzberg (1981)).…”
Section: Switchover Costs In Organizational Changesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Seuls quelques travaux analysent l'effet des usages imprévus des instruments de gestion sur leur dynamique. Par exemple, Beer et Cannon (2004) Le cas évoqué par Franchet (2005) est aussi particulièrement intéressant. En 1989, l'usine sidérurgique de Florange a été parmi les premiers sites en France à engager une gestion des compétences.…”
Section: Les Usages Imprévus Des Instruments De Gestion Des Compétencesunclassified
“…Considérant qu'ils sont liés au fait que les salariés ne respectent pas les règles prévues pour l'utilisation des instruments, ils refusent de transformer les instruments pour tenter de prendre en compte ces usages réels mais non prévus. Cette déconnexion entre l'instrument et l'activité réelle conduit souvent à l'abandon de cet instrument (Beer, Cannon, 2004). Elle ne constitue donc pas une solution pour le redynamiser.…”
Section: Redynamisationunclassified