Projects and Team Dynamics

Georgiadis, George

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1907349

Cited by 23 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 50 publications

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“…Although Georgiadis (2013) shows that backloading all rewards is optimal when the project size is given exogenously, it is unclear that this continues to be the case when the project size is endogenous and the manager has limited commitment power. It would be interesting to explore whether a more elaborate scheme in which the manager provides agents with flow payments while the project is in progress (e.g., Sannikov, 2008) or uses time-dependent contracts (e.g., milestones with deadlines) can improve her discounted profit.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This problem is studied by Georgiadis (2013) for a fixed project size, who shows that similar to Proposition 1, a unique solution to this system of ODE exists, and¯ (q ; Q) > 0 and increasing in q, which in turn implies that the MPE is unique. It is worth noting that the non-Markovian strategies characterized in this article no longer constitute a PPE if the project progresses according to the above stochastic process.…”

Section: Variable Incentive Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Intuitively, this is because a deviation from the equilibrium path cannot be detected instantaneously with probability 1. Georgiadis (2011) shows that the agents are time-consistent with respect to their optimal project size, which implies that similar to the deterministic case, their optimal project size is independent of the commitment power y. Unfortunately however, the analysis of the manager's choice of Q is not tractable.…”

Section: Variable Incentive Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…More recently, Yildirim (2006) and Kessing (2007) show that in contrast to the case in which the project generates flow payments while it is in progress, as studied by Fershtman and Nitzan (1991), efforts are strategic complements when the agents receive a payoff only upon completion. Georgiadis (2013) studies how the incentives to contribute to a public good project depend on the team composition and examines how a manager should choose the team composition and the agents' compensation scheme. A feature common to most articles in this literature is that the size of the project is given exogenously.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Project Design with Limited Commitment and Teams

2012

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We study the interaction between a group of agents who exert effort to complete a project and a manager who chooses its objectives. The manager has limited commitment power so that she can commit to the objectives only when the project is sufficiently close to completion. We show that the manager has incentives to extend the project as it progresses. This result has two implications.First, the manager will choose a larger project if she has less commitment power. Second, the manager should delegate the decision rights over the project size to the agents unless she has sufficient commitment power.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Variable Incentive Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Variable Incentive Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Project Design with Limited Commitment and Teams

2012

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“…18 17 See Radner (1992) and Zandt (1999) for surveys of models of team production. Georgiadis (2015) and Cvitanic and Georgiadis (2015) study Markov equilibria in a continuous-time model similar to ours in which the game terminates if and only if the state variable reaches some pre-established threshold.…”

Section: Team Productionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gradual Adjustment and Equilibrium Uniqueness Under Noisy Monitoring

Iijima

Kasahara

2016

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe study the implications of flexible adjustment in strategic interactions using a class of finite-horizon models in continuous time. Players take costly actions to affect the evolution of state variables that are commonly observable and perturbed by Brownian noise.The values of these state variables influence players' terminal payoffs at the deadline, as well as their flow payoffs. In contrast to the static case, the equilibrium is unique under a general class of terminal payoff functions. Our characterization of the equilibrium builds on recent developments in the theory of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs). We use this tool to analyze applications, including team production, hold-up problems, and dynamic contests. In a team production model, the unique equilibrium selects an efficient outcome when frictions vanish.

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Teamwise Mean Field Competitions

Zhang

Zhou

2021

Appl Math Optim

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This paper studies competitions with rank-based reward among a large number of teams. Within each sizable team, we consider a mean-field contribution game in which each team member contributes to the jump intensity of a common Poisson project process; across all teams, a mean field competition game is formulated on the rank of the completion time, namely the jump time of Poisson project process, and the reward to each team is paid based on its ranking. On the layer of teamwise competition game, three optimization problems are introduced when the team size is determined by: (i) the team manager; (ii) the central planner; (iii) the team members' voting as partnership. We propose a relative performance criteria for each team member to share the team's reward and formulate some special cases of mean field games of mean field games, which are new to the literature. In all problems with homogeneous parameters, the equilibrium control of each worker and the equilibrium or optimal team size can be computed in an explicit manner, allowing us to analytically examine the impacts of some model parameters and discuss their economic implications. Two numerical examples are also presented to illustrate the parameter dependence and comparison between different team size decision making.

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Projects and Team Dynamics

Cited by 23 publications

References 50 publications

Project Design with Limited Commitment and Teams

Project Design with Limited Commitment and Teams

Gradual Adjustment and Equilibrium Uniqueness Under Noisy Monitoring

Teamwise Mean Field Competitions

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