Projects and Team Dynamics

Georgiadis, George

doi:10.1093/restud/rdu031

Cited by 71 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…The intuition behind the second part of statement (i) is straightforward: if the agents receive a larger reward upon completion, then their incentives are stronger. The threshold results in statements (ii) and (iii) are similar to Georgiadis () who studies a stochastic version of this model with a fixed project size…”

Section: Agents' Problemsupporting

confidence: 80%

“…In our model, agents are compensated upon completion of the project and their compensation is independent of the completion time of the project. Although Georgiadis () shows that backloading all rewards is optimal when the project size is given exogenously, it is unclear that this continues to be the case when the project size is endogenous and the manager has limited commitment power. It would be interesting to explore whether a more elaborate scheme in which the manager provides agents with flow payments while the project is in progress (e.g., Sannikov, ) or uses time‐dependent contracts (e.g., milestones with deadlines) can improve her discounted profit.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…More recently, Yildirim () and Kessing () show that in contrast to the case in which the project generates flow payments while it is in progress, as studied by Fershtman and Nitzan (), efforts are strategic complements when the agents receive a payoff only upon completion. Georgiadis () studies how the incentives to contribute to a public good project depend on the team composition and examines how a manager should choose the team composition and the agents' compensation scheme. A feature common to most articles in this literature is that the size of the project is given exogenously.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Project design with limited commitment and teams

Georgiadis

Lippman

Tang

2014

The RAND J of Economics

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We study the interaction between a group of agents who exert effort to complete a project and a manager who chooses its objectives. The manager has limited commitment power so that she can commit to the objectives only when the project is sufficiently close to completion. We show that the manager has incentives to extend the project as it progresses. This result has two implications.First, the manager will choose a larger project if she has less commitment power. Second, the manager should delegate the decision rights over the project size to the agents unless she has sufficient commitment power.

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Section: Agents' Problemsupporting

confidence: 80%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Project design with limited commitment and teams

Georgiadis

Lippman

Tang

2014

The RAND J of Economics

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“…Another closely related paper is Georgiadis (2015), who develops a dynamic model that a group of agents collaborate to complete a project. A pay-off is generated only upon completion.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Contracting in a Continuous-Time Model with Three-Sided Moral Hazard and Cost Synergies

Yang

Chen

2018

SSRN Journal

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We study optimal effort and compensation in a continuous-time model with threesided moral hazard and cost synergies. One agent exerts initial effort to start the project; the other two agents exert ongoing effort to manage it. The project generates cash flow at a fixed rate over its lifespan; cash flow stops if a failure occurs. The three agents' efforts jointly determine the probability of the project's survival and thus its expected cash flows. We model cost synergies between the two agents exerting ongoing effort as one's effort reduces the other's cost of effort. In the optimal contract, the timing of payments reflects the timing of efforts as well as cost synergies across agents. The agent exerting upfront effort claims all cash flows prior to a predetermined cutoff date, and the two agents exerting ongoing effort divide all subsequent cash flows. Delaying payments motivate these two agents to work hard throughout. Between them, the agent with greater degree of moral hazard and bigger impact on reducing the other agent's cost claims a larger fraction of the cash flow. Our study sheds light on a broad set of contracting problems, such as compensation plans in startups and profit sharing among business partners.

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“…This paper is also related to the literature on dynamic contributions to a discrete public project, where a group of agents exert costly efforts to complete a project and the project generates a pay off to each of the contributing members upon completion. Agents are heterogeneous in the sense that they differ in terms of the pay off they receive upon completion and the contribution cost (Bowen, Georgiadis, & Lambert, ; Cvitanic & Georgiadis, ) or only in the pay off they receive upon completion (Georgiadis, ). Georgiadis, Lippman, and Tang () analyze such a contribution game with homogeneous agents.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Heterogeneity, impatience, and dynamic private provision of a discrete public good

Bhattacharya

Tokovenko

Sardana

2017

J Public Economic Theory

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We analyze dynamic private provision of a discrete public good by heterogeneous agents, who differ in terms of their levels of impatience, in a differential game framework. In contrast to the strategic complementarity result for homogeneous individuals, we show that an asymmetric completion Markov perfect equilibrium exists, where the individual contributions and the strategic behaviors depend crucially on an impatience differential: the difference in rates of time preference across groups of individuals. When this differential is insignificant, contributions of both types of individuals are strategic complements. On the other hand, when this impatience differential exceeds a threshold, the contributions of impatient individuals become strategic substitutes, whereas the contributions of patient individuals remain strategic complements. We show that group size has an interesting role to play in the strategic behavior: increasing the number of patient individuals aggravates the incentives to free‐ride by the impatient agents. We also derive a condition under which all the socially beneficial projects get completed in the equilibrium.

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Projects and Team Dynamics

Cited by 71 publications

References 30 publications

Project design with limited commitment and teams

Project design with limited commitment and teams

Contracting in a Continuous-Time Model with Three-Sided Moral Hazard and Cost Synergies

Heterogeneity, impatience, and dynamic private provision of a discrete public good

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