Projective Identification and the Empathic Process

Abstract

their solid grounding in work in the therapeutic situation will serve the reader well in this admirably useful volume."-Merton Gill ".,. the most nearly complete and meticulously developed concept of countertransference to date." -James Grotste'n ".. . the most up-todate and comprehensive account of countertransference, empathy, and projective identification available. . . . a remarkable contribution to the psychoanalytic literature. Everyone involved in doing psychoanalytic therapy-as well as those interested primarily in theory-will find this book of the greatest relevance. It is highly recommended."-Joseph Sandler ". . . Drs. Tansey and Burke present an elegantly clear and precise elucidation of the ernpathic process and its disruption. In a nonauthoritarian and nondoctrinairc manner, they strive to enhance clinical judgment rather than to replace it. Their discussion of projective identification and its clinical ramifications is a masterpiece of clinical wisdom and is the singularly most helpful I have yet to find in the literature."-Althea J. Horner

Compassion Fatigue and Countertransference: Two Different Concepts

“…This positivistic view has changed over time, most dramatically in the past two decades (Gabbard 1995;Hoffman, 1983;Mitchell 1993;Ogden 1994a, b;Renik 1993;Tansey and Burke 1985). Today, the therapist's countertransference is anything but neutral.…”

Some Notes on the Epistemology of Empathy

“…2 The emphasis in trial identification falls on the identity of subject and object; as Jacobs (2007) emphasizes: "He [Fliess] stressed the fact that for a period the analyst must become the patient; emotionally, he is the patient, and thereby is subject to all the turmoil and all the pain that the patient feels" (p. 722, italics in original). 3 As Tansey and Burke (1985) pointed out, this trial identification can be understood as synonymous with Racker's (1968) concordant identification (see below).…”

“…Thus, later in this paper, I will refer to aspects of embodied cognition as nonconscious, meaning that they are never conscious because of their nature, not because they are defended against or dynamically motivated and thereby excluded from consciousness. ence, empathy has been described by these authors as also related to cognitive and intellectual aspects of the analyst's experience, as in generative empathy (Schafer 1959), coenesthetic communication (Spitz 1965), vicarious introspection (Kohut 1959(Kohut , 1965, emotional knowing (Greenson 1960), resonant cognition (Kelman 1987), and even as a form of projective identification (PI) (Ogden 1979;Tansey andBurke 1985, 1989).…”

“…Likewise, viewing empathy as involving a form of projection or PI (Auerhahn and Peskin 2003;Beres and Arlow 1974;Berger 1984;Tansey andBurke 1985, 1989), despite its antecedents in Freud (1905;see also Pigman 1995), has its difficulties. I will say more about this below, but briefly, to the extent that it is projective, from the perspective of the projecting subject it is not empathic; rather than attuning oneself to the self-experience of the object, it tends to envision the object in terms of one's own self-experience.…”

“…Conceptual empathy arises from experiences either with others or within oneself, as well as from more general experiences related to the creative symbolism of myth, art, and religion. It involves integration of specific self-and object representations: the analyst may construct a conceptual model of the patient that includes a more elaborate, accurate, and individualized impression based on data gathered in the course of analysis (Greenson 1960(Greenson , 1967Kernberg 1993;Peterfreund 1975;Tansey and Burke 1989). 9 See also Tuch (1999).…”