Project risk management and design flexibility: Analysing a case and conditions of complementarity

Gil, Nuno; Tether, Bruce

doi:10.1016/j.respol.2010.10.011

Cited by 109 publications

(97 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…Exclusion does not erase conflict, however. If the excluded parties are powerful and influential, they may try to sabotage the development process or lobby for changes that get increasingly costly and risky to implement as development unfolds (Morris 1987, Miller and Lessard 2001, Pitsis et al 2003, Gil and Tether 2011. Hence an enduring goal in various literatures has been to search for organizational forms amenable to design change and concomitant trade-offs between flexibility and efficiency (cf.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Sharing Design Rights: A Commons Approach for Developing Infrastructure

Gil¹,

Baldwin²

2014

AMPROC

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This study empirically investigates the relationship between design structure and organization structure in the context of new infrastructure development projects. Our research setting is a capital program to develop new school buildings in the city of Manchester, UK. Instead of creating a controlled, hierarchical organization, which would mirror the buildings' design structure, the Manchester City Council created a "commons organization," and chose to share decision-rights with local claimants. Each school's faculty was thus given rights equal to Council staff to participate in the design process and to approve the school's design. In the natural resources literature, commons theory predicts that, if a robust governance structure is created, this complex form of organizing gives claimants incentives to contribute to the enterprise whilst dampening collective action problems (Ostrom 1990). Here we extend this claim to the production of man-made artifacts. The design commons induced teachers to volunteer time and effort to communicate their practical knowledge, but created corresponding tensions over interdependent choices for the final design. Yet, none of the projects succumbed to collective action problems in the form of budget overruns, bogged-down processes, or users feeling disenfranchised. Applying Ostrom's (1990) principles of robust commons governance, we show that the Manchester design commons organization was robust by her criteria and propose that robustness contributed positively to the outcome. We also discuss design flexibility as an intervening variable that was critical in reconciling differences that governance alone could not resolve. We conclude with the rudiments of a theory describing when and why a commons organization can be advantageous for production of designs. INTRODUCTIONDoes the physical structure of a design constrain the structure of the organization that produces the design? Scholars commencing with Henderson and Clark (1990) have argued that design organizations will "come to mirror the internal structure of the product they are designing" (ibid. p. 27). This so-called "mirroring hypothesis" suggests that technology imposes a structure on organizations that produce designs. To avoid integration failure (Puranam and Goetting 2011), designs with high levels of designchoice interdependency (hence task interdependency in the design process) should be created by tight-knit teams with closely aligned incentives, generally lodged within a single firm (Thompson, 1967, Brooks 1973, Nickerson and Zenger 2004, Colfer and Baldwin 2010. Conversely, modular designs with low degrees of design-choice interdependency can be created by loosely coupled individuals with disparate knowledge and incentives, often lodged in different firms (Orton and Weick 1992, Langlois and Robertson 1992, Sanchez and Mahoney 1996, Fine 1998, Baldwin and Clark 2000, Colfer and Baldwin 2010, Puranam and Goetting 2011. Thus "the coordination tasks implicit in specific product designs SHARING DESIGN RIGHTS J ANUARY 201...

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As a result, infrastructure projects frequently run late, overrun budgets, and deliver outputs that leave many user groups and communities discontent (Morris 1994, Miller and Lessard 2001, Pitsis et al 2003, Esty, 2004, Gil and Tether 2011.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sharing Design Rights: A Commons Approach for Developing Infrastructure

Gil¹,

Baldwin²

2014

AMPROC

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“…In practice, in large manufacturing environments with simultaneous design and development of several product lines, a 'single-capture process' approach to requirements is infeasible. One of the impractical assumptions that is associated with adopting a single-capture requirements process is that it is considered a relatively easy task to assign 'content ownership' of any requirement (Gil and Tether, 2011). Identifying content owners for each requirement is increasingly difficult where a physical component might be controlled through software located in a completely different section of the architecture.…”

Section: Organizational and Business Challenges In Creating Complex Pmentioning

confidence: 99%

Navigating Complex Systems Design with the PEArL Framework

Champion

2016

International Journal of Information Technologies and Systems Approach

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The problems and difficulties in complex systems design are more subjective and ambiguous than commonly acknowledged and soft systems tools and frameworks can help to address gaps in knowledge and support judgement throughout the design process. This paper describes the application of the PEArL framework, an intellectual device based on systemic principles, to support a team in a complex product environment manage the 'soft' challenges in complex systems design. The PEArL framework facilitated the creation and management of inter-disciplinary relationships in a pressurised business environment and provided a structure for validation of the way in which the design process had been undertaken.

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“…Adding flexibility to the design structure also attenuates conflict because it leaves options open and thus lowers future adaptation costs (Gil, 2007;Gil, Biesek, & Freeman, 2015;Gil & Tether, 2011). But to 'future proof' large integral designs against an array of foreseeable claims invariably demands investment in costly safeguards, e.g., deeper foundations, redundant equipment, and may sacrifice operational performance.…”

Section: The Capability To Develop a Technical Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Capabilities for Megaproject Architects: Sequencing Network Growth and Bottleneck Removal

Lundrigan¹,

Gil²

2016

AMPROC

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This study discusses strategic capabilities necessary to improve the performance of the promoters of new developments of large infrastructure so-called megaprojects. To get to the end goal, promoters must assemble vast networks of resource-rich, autonomous actors and share with them direct control over high-level design decisions for indivisible components.Hence promoters are 'system-architects', and they need architectural knowledge both of the stakeholder landscape and technical design to carry on their task structure. Promoters that act strategically, we argue, deliberately manipulate the sequence of arrival of the actors and keep a selected few at bay. An ideal sequence aligns the growth of the network with the hierarchy of design choices and creates cohesive groups to strike consensuses on local solutions. We discuss pitfalls ahead of attempts to orderly eliminate development bottlenecks and thus stabilise performance expectations, a prerequisite to sustain public legitimacy for the scheme.

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Project risk management and design flexibility: Analysing a case and conditions of complementarity

Cited by 109 publications

References 48 publications

Sharing Design Rights: A Commons Approach for Developing Infrastructure

Sharing Design Rights: A Commons Approach for Developing Infrastructure

Navigating Complex Systems Design with the PEArL Framework

Strategic Capabilities for Megaproject Architects: Sequencing Network Growth and Bottleneck Removal

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