Project Managers: Gatekeepers or Inside Men?

Gunnerud, Gustav; Evjen, Sondre; Søfting, Rune; Lædre, Ola; Kjesbu, Nina Eklo; Lohne, Jardar

doi:10.1108/s2516-285320190000002057

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…According to the general outline of P/A-theory outlined above, this means that 1) there will probably be a lack of goal alignment between the sub-contractors and the project client; 2) that there will be a severe information asymmetry problem due to the organisational form of the project and that 3) this will probably mean that the client (dependent on the number of levels of sub-contractors involved) will have little to no information of what actually happens at the level of the organisation where actual physical work is carried outincluding being aware or not of criminal activity. Gunnerud et al (2019) explore opportunistic behaviour from project managers following such an analysis. As Lohne et al (2019b) illustrated, this fuzzy landscape can serve project clients quite wellthey benefit from criminal activity that they do not know of.…”

Section: Agency Problems Within the Norwegian Aec-industrymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The main challenge to their efficiency seems to be the challenges of reducing project organisations' complexity, given the endeavour's complexity, see Haugen et al (2017). Gunnerud et al (2019) found that even though the contracts intend to restrict the possibilities for criminal activities, project managers have substantial room for manoeuvre for criminal activities.…”

Section: Measures For Countering Criminal Activitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Agency Problems as a Driver for Crime in the Aec-Industry

Lohne¹,

Drevland²,

Lædre³

2021

Proc. 29th Annual Conference of the International Group for Lean Construction (IGLC)

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The paper seeks to outline agency problems as a fundamental driver for crime occurring in the AEC industry. The investigation uses Principal/Agent-theory to articulate how specific industry mechanisms serve as structural drivers of crime and how they can be counteracted.This paper is conceptual, based on former empirical investigations-the approach springs from industry knowledge, extensive literature reviews and empirical research.The research reveals that little discussion has been carried out concerning the root causes of criminal activity within the AEC industry. Widespread theoretical insights from economics and criminology can explain significant parts of the challenges. Production control efforts seem to be an auspicious path for combatting crime.Being under-analysed to such a degree as identified, the theoretical conditions for criminal activity within the AEC industry needs more in-depth consideration. This need for further exploration especially concerns the implications of criminal activity on advanced process-driven production systems approaches. Establishing effective countermeasures depends heavily on such an understanding.

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Section: Agency Problems Within the Norwegian Aec-industrymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Measures For Countering Criminal Activitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Agency Problems as a Driver for Crime in the Aec-Industry

Lohne¹,

Drevland²,

Lædre³

2021

Proc. 29th Annual Conference of the International Group for Lean Construction (IGLC)

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“…It was therefore established that available controls had gaps that allowed work related criminal activities to continue. Evjen, et al (2019) cited the main problems as: warnings; procurement and bureaucratic process which were a hindrance to effective control of subcontractors. Reduced number of reporting authorities or tiers was suggested as one measure of controlling criminal activities.…”

Section: Sub-contractor Oversight and Real Estate Construction Projects Cost Overrunsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Subcontractor Oversight on Construction Cost Overruns in Real Estate Projects in Nairobi and Kisumu Counties, Kenya

Kepher¹,

Rambo²,

Nyonje³

2021

JSD

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Cost overruns have provided a significant challenge in the construction industries of both developed and developing countries. The purpose of this study was to investigate the influence Subcontractor Oversight on Construction Cost Overruns of real estate projects in Nairobi and Kisumu Counties. The study was guided by objective, to establish the extent to which subcontractor oversight influence real estate construction projects cost overruns. The research adopted descriptive survey and correlational research designs. The study targeted a population of 4000 project professionals that constituted 7 professionals from active real estates in Nairobi and Kisumu Counties and 10 key informants from the real estate industry. Using the Krejcie and Morgan table of sample size determination, the sample size for this study was 351. The study then adopted stratified, simple random and purposive sampling methods to select appropriate sample sizes from the study population strata. Structured questionnaire was the main instrument for data collection, supported by interview guide. Hypothesis was tested at α=0.05 level of significance and the results were: H0: There is no significant relationship between subcontractor oversight and real estate construction projects cost overruns was rejected since P=0.000<0.05. Considering the study findings and conclusions, the following recommendations were made: Project professionals and other relevant real estate project stakeholders should encourage comprehensive subcontractor oversight as critical concerns in assembling pertinent information and creating avenues that could be utilized to reduce real estate construction projects cost overruns.

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Managing Procurement Ability Over Time: A Study of Swedish Construction Clients

Lohne

Mohn

2023

SDGs in Construction Economics and Organization

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Project Managers: Gatekeepers or Inside Men?

Cited by 5 publications

References 9 publications

Agency Problems as a Driver for Crime in the Aec-Industry

Agency Problems as a Driver for Crime in the Aec-Industry

Subcontractor Oversight on Construction Cost Overruns in Real Estate Projects in Nairobi and Kisumu Counties, Kenya

Managing Procurement Ability Over Time: A Study of Swedish Construction Clients

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