2009
DOI: 10.1016/j.rfe.2009.02.002
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Project financing: Deal or no deal

Abstract: Most research on project financing focuses mainly on structuring and financing issues. In this paper we propose a model that incorporates the effects of the management efforts on market outcomes in its framework. Thus, we can examine project financing from the perspective of managerial incentives. The model highlights a set of conditions under which corporations prefer off‐balance‐sheet project financing. The choice is driven by the required amount of investment and the extent of uncertainty. Companies tend to… Show more

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Cited by 11 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…In the event of high volatility, the addition of high-risk investment can have an adverse effect on the existing block (White, 1976; Pollio, 1998; Ballestero, 2000; An and Cheung, 2010; Subramanian and Tung, 2016). Such high-risk and high default probable projects may have cascading effects and force the various stakeholders to re-examine their business associations.…”
Section: Discussion On Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the event of high volatility, the addition of high-risk investment can have an adverse effect on the existing block (White, 1976; Pollio, 1998; Ballestero, 2000; An and Cheung, 2010; Subramanian and Tung, 2016). Such high-risk and high default probable projects may have cascading effects and force the various stakeholders to re-examine their business associations.…”
Section: Discussion On Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Project finance allows sponsors to mitigate the risks that originate from the fact that the project company's managers' efforts have little impact on market outcomes. A model proposed by An and Cheung (2010) argues that "companies tend to prefer corporate financing of investment when effort has a significant impact on the magnitude and likelihood of favorable outcomes" and vice versa. When projects become very large and require a commensurate large capital budget it is less likely that companies can manage the risk and associated expenditure from normal operations.…”
Section: Transfer the Risk To Risk Management Professionals (Insurers)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Both these risk aversion values lie within the one to five range that many economists consider to be realistic (e.g., Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2004;Parrino et al, 2005;and An and Cheung, 2010). We also vary this figure between 0 and 100 to examine the sensitivity of dividend cyclicality to the manager's degree of risk aversion.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%