Profound Intellectual Disability and the Bestowment View of Moral Status

Abstract

This article engages with debates concerning the moral worth of human beings with profound intellectual and multiple disabilities (PIMDs). Some argue that those with such disabilities are morally less valuable than so-called normal human beings, whereas others argue that all human beings have equal moral value and that, therefore, each group of humans ought to be treated with equal concern. We will argue in favor of a view that takes points from opposing camps in the debates about the moral worth of humans with such disabilities. Our position, roughly, is this: most humans with PIMDs are persons in the morally significant sense and, therefore, deserve moral consideration equal to that granted to so-called "normal" human beings. Some humans with PIMD may not be persons, but nevertheless deserve moral consideration equal to that of persons because they stand in a special relation to persons.

Narrowed Lives: Meaning, Moral Value, and Profound Intellectual Disability

“…This is the view taken byKittay (2005) and our previous selves(Curtis & Vehmas, 2014;Vehmas & Curtis, 2017), among others (other examples includeMullin, 2011 andJaworska &Tannenbaum, 2015).…”

“…But, in the spirit of intellectual modesty, we admit that since then we have struggled to say precisely where the arguments of the moral individualists do in fact go wrong. In a pair of early papers we developed an account according to which moral status can be grounded in relational terms (Curtis & Vehmas, 2014;Vehmas & Curtis, 2017). It is a position that we now, at least partially, reject.…”

“…Considering that the founding ethical conviction of this project was the recognition of the inalienable worth of persons with PIMD as fellow humans (Vehmas & Curtis, 2017), as well as an ambition to understand what makes a good life for them, it is necessary to address the issue of sexuality -better later than never. An account that dismissed a basic entitlement such as sexuality would be defective as it would fail to do justice to their personhood, and their equal value as humans with the possibility to explore and express their sexuality.…”

“…That is, causing 27 Pets are a special group of animals whose moral status is not directly related to their species but, rather, to their relationship with their owners. In in some philosophical accounts their moral status is seen somewhat similar to that of people with PIMD (see Vehmas & Curtis, 2017). But from that view there is long way to the conclusion that persons with PIMD could be put down for their own good when they suffer from incurable sickness, as is the case with pets.…”

“…It seems that moral individualists (at least McMahan) are not talking about people like Sesha when they use expressions such as 'severely mentally retarded'. This raises the question about the empirical relevance of their arguments, which, in our view, moral individualists overlook; in order to have any relevance, the conceptual claims in this context require empirical substantiation(Vehmas & Curtis, 2017).…”