Profits, malversations, restitutions. Les bénéfices des financiers durant la guerre de la Ligue d’Augsbourg et la taxe de Chamillart

Félix, Joël

doi:10.3917/rhis.154.0831

Cited by 5 publications

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“…On the financial front, Chamillart's personal hostility to the traitants d'affaires extraordinaires, i.e. the financiers who sold royal offices on the king's behalf, meant that the minister was open to alternative methods for raising cheaper credit (Doyle 1997; Félix 2015). Chamillart was interested in a proposal, inspired by the Amsterdam credit market, to issue rentes mobilières , or bearer notes, that could be traded more easily than the illiquid rentes perpétuelles (royal perpetual loans) (Béguin 2012).…”

Section: IImentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this respect, I believe that Rowlands’ excellent work on Louis XIV's finances is wrong in its assessment of Chamillart's abilities and alleged blindness to the evil advice of corrupt advisors and dishonest bankers. If it seems unlikely that Chamillart will ever be seen as a great minister by historians, his published and manuscript notes show that he was deeply aware of the shortcomings of Louis XIV's fiscal system and, for this very reason, sought to exercise firmer control over the financial community (Félix 2015) and introduce fiscal reforms. Yet, as I will argue, his aims and achievements were severely hampered by domestic politics and the external pressures of international warfare.…”

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confidence: 99%

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‘The most difficult financial matter that has ever presented itself’: paper money and the financing of warfare under Louis XIV

Félix

2018

Financial History Review

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Based on an extensive survey of French primary sources and a discussion of the recent literature on fiscal policy in France and Europe during Louis XIV's wars, this article revisits the rationale behind the first experiment with paper money undertaken by finance minister Michel Chamillart, comparing it to other belligerents’ strategies, in particular England's, to adjust their monetary regime to the challenges of funding long wars of attrition. The article shows how concerns about economic activity, coinage and the need to finance the war deficit led to a series of debasements of the French currency, the establishment of a bank in the form of aCaisse des empruntsand the introduction of mint bills, which became legal tender and caused the first experience of fiat money inflation in history. Whereas Chamillart's personal shortcomings have been recently suggested as the cause of Louis XIV's humbling in the War of the Spanish Succession, I argue on the contrary that the introduction of paper money in 1704 was key to the capacity of France to sustain its military effort, but that a succession of military defeats against a more powerful coalition led to inflation. I also argue that the introduction of paper money saved theCaisse des empruntsand its bonds which helped sustain the war effort up until the peace. By situating the use of paper money within the broader question of the exercise of power in the absolute monarchy, this article examines the formation of fiscal policy, paying attention to the ways in which government sought advice from experts. It concludes by calling for further studies on policy- and decision-making under Louis XIV.

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Section: IImentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%