Profit or politics? Understanding renationalizations in Russia

Chernykh, Lucy

doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.06.009

Cited by 67 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…Further research could address the renationalization of firms during the 2000s. While questions including the rationale behind the nationalizations have been addressed (see, Chernykh, 2011), the performance consequences from increases in state ownership in Russian firms could be further investigated. Furthermore, Bradshaw et al (2016) have shown using Chinese firm data that state ownership tend to increase taxes paid.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Complex state ownership, competition, and firm performance – Russian evidence

Liljeblom

Maury

Hörhammer

2019

IJOEM

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Purpose -State ownership has been common especially in industries with restricted competition. In Russia, state-controlled firms represent around 41 percent of the market value of all listed firms (Deloitte, 2015). Yet, there is a significant gap in the literature regarding the effects of various forms of government control in listed firms. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap by exploring the impact of the complexity of state ownership and competition on the performance of Russian listed firms. Design/methodology/approach -The sample consists of data for 72 firms (360 firm-years) in the Russian MOEX broad market index during 2011-2015. The complexity of state ownership is captured by studying forms of state control including majority/minority, direct/indirect, federal/regional, mixed structures and golden shares. Findings -The authors find significant differences in performance relating to different forms of state ownership. State control is negatively related to firm valuation and the sales/employees ratio. Performance is weakest when state ownership takes the form minority, regional or direct ownership. State control through golden shares typically outperforms other state-controlled firms. The authors find indications of employment prioritization beyond the economical optimum. In addition, the relation between state ownership and profitability becomes positive in sectors where state firms appear to enjoy lower competition. Originality/value -While the effects of state ownership have been studied on many markets, there is a lack of studies on the effects of different forms, or the complexity, of state ownership beyond direct and indirect ownership. The authors contribute to the literature on the performance effects of state ownership by studying a multitude of forms of governmental ownership as well as the role of competition in Russia. Especially the profitability of state-controlled firms is significantly affected by industry characteristics. Implications of the results are discussed both from firm and policy maker perspectives.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Complex state ownership, competition, and firm performance – Russian evidence

Liljeblom

Maury

Hörhammer

2019

IJOEM

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“…Despite massive privatization in the 1990s, many companies in Russia are still state controlled or have been renationalized (Chernykh 2011). Since 2005, output of these companies accounted for more than 50 percent of Russia's GDP.…”

Section: A State-controlled Companies In Russiamentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Media and Corruption

Ениколопов

Petrova

Sonin

2018

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics

104

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“…A small strand of literature has analyzed the determinants of some publicization episodes. Chernykh () analyzes the wave of renationalization that took place in Russia after 2004. She finds that nationalizations occurred in strategic sectors and were not correlated with the firm's financial debt.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public Enterprises in the Market for Corporate Control: Recent Worldwide Evidence

Clò

Ferraris

et al. 2015

Ann Public Coop Econ

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This paper analyzes deals involving private and public enterprises, i.e. State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) worldwide since 2004. We consider four types of deals: privatizations of SOEs, public enterprises acquiring private ones (public-private deals), private reorganizations (i.e private firms acquiring a private target) and public reorganizations. (i.e. both acquirer and target are SOEs). We study whether the predeal performance and corporate characteristics of the acquirer and target companies vary across the four types of deals depending on ownership: public or private. Data are taken from Zephyr (Bureau Van Dijk), which provides information on completed deals worldwide and Orbis, a firm-level dataset (also implemented by BvD). Some results of previous literature on M&As performed by private firms ('the inefficiency management hypothesis') are both confirmed and expanded. Acquirers involved in deals are both larger and better performing than their targets but some qualifications are in order with respect to ownership. The difference in size and performance between acquirers and targets is in fact more pronounced for public with respect to private acquirers. The evidence thus points to an active role of SOEs as acquirers, as they significantly out-perform relative to their targets, including private ones, in terms of return on sales. Given these novel findings, further research is needed to examine the motivations behind the different types of deals considered and to verify the role of government ownership in the contemporary global economy. * This paper has been written within the context of the CIRIEC project 'The Future of the Public Enterprises'. The views and opinions expressed in the paper are solely those of the authors. The authors are grateful for helpful comments to two anonymous referees and to participants of CIRIEC 2013 workshops in Berlin and Brussels, where previous versions have been presented.

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Profit or politics? Understanding renationalizations in Russia

Cited by 67 publications

References 30 publications

Complex state ownership, competition, and firm performance – Russian evidence

Complex state ownership, competition, and firm performance – Russian evidence

Social Media and Corruption

Public Enterprises in the Market for Corporate Control: Recent Worldwide Evidence

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