Professionalization of Online Gaming? Theoretical and Empirical Analysis for a Monopoly-Holding Platform

Ribeiro, Vitor Miguel; Bao, Lei

doi:10.3390/jtaer16040040

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…e teaching material resources are mainly for teachers and provide rich and diversified multimedia material resources to meet the teaching needs of teachers in developing network courseware [18,19]. e module mainly consists of four parts: resource storage submodule, resource type management submodule, resource modification submodule, and resource retrieval submodule.…”

Section: Design Of Platform Functionalmentioning

confidence: 99%

An English Online Homework Tutoring System Supported by Internet Database

Hao

2021

Journal of Mathematics

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College English tutoring is an important content of current research, and how to provide more effective methods for teaching tutoring is currently a hot research topic. Therefore, this paper designs an Internet-based online tutoring platform for college English teaching, which is accelerated by using the K-means clustering algorithm. The data processing efficiency and processing methods to improve user satisfaction require more practical experience to summarize. In the business logic layer, the uploaded information is mined through the K-means clustering algorithm to form an online tutoring university English database to provide platform data support, realize the business logic judgment of the data, convert the data in the database, and return to the user interface of other formats, to provide users with browsing and consulting. In the data access layer, the data from the business logic layer is processed. After the processing is completed, data can be added, deleted, modified, and checked in the database. Finally, the operation result of the database is fed back to the business logic layer for processing. Experimental results show that the designed platform has good data mining performance, low connection speed and low response delay, good compatibility, low CPU usage, fast resource sharing speed, and high user satisfaction. It can be connected to different operating systems.

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Section: Design Of Platform Functionalmentioning

confidence: 99%

An English Online Homework Tutoring System Supported by Internet Database

Hao

2021

Journal of Mathematics

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“…One strand in this literature focuses on the optimal pricing of a monopoly platform in two-sided (or even multi-sided) markets, and neglects the competition between platforms (e.g., [14][15][16][17]).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

A Dynamic Contest Model of Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets

Grossmann

Lang

Dietl

2021

JTAER

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This paper examines the dynamic competition between platform firms in two-sided markets with network externalities. In our model, two platforms compete with each other via a contest to dominate a certain market. If one platform wins the contest, it can serve the market for a certain duration as a monopolistic platform. Our paper shows that platform firms can compensate for cost disadvantages with network effects. A head start (e.g., technological advantage) does not guarantee future success for platform firms. Network effects and cost efficiency are decisive for future success. Interestingly, higher costs of a platform can induce higher platform profits in our dynamic model. Moreover, we find that a platform’s size and profit are not necessarily positively correlated. Our model also provides new insights with respect to the underlying causes for the emergence of market dominance. The combination of technological carry-over and network effects can explain a long-lasting dominance of a platform that benefits from a head start. The necessary preconditions for this emergence are convex costs, small network effects and high carry-over.

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A Dynamic Contest Model of Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets

2016

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This paper examines the dynamic competition between platform firms in two-sided markets with network externalities. In our model, two platforms compete with each other via a contest to dominate a certain market. If one platform wins the contest, it can serve the market for a certain duration as a monopolistic platform. Our paper shows that platform firms can compensate for cost disadvantages with network effects. A head start (e.g., technological advantage) does not guarantee future success for platform firms. Network effects and cost efficiency are decisive for future success. Interestingly, higher costs of a platform can induce higher platform profits in our dynamic model. Moreover, we find that a platform's size and profit are not necessarily positively correlated. Our model also provides new insights with respect to the underlying causes for the emergence of market dominance. The combination of technological carry-over and network effects can explain a long-lasting dominance of a platform that benefits from a head start. The necessary preconditions for this emergence are convex costs, small network effects and high carry-over.

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Professionalization of Online Gaming? Theoretical and Empirical Analysis for a Monopoly-Holding Platform

Cited by 5 publications

References 33 publications

An English Online Homework Tutoring System Supported by Internet Database

An English Online Homework Tutoring System Supported by Internet Database

A Dynamic Contest Model of Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets

A Dynamic Contest Model of Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets

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